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INSURING AGAINST TERRORISM 
-AND CRIME 
Saul Levmore* and Kyle D. Logue** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The attacks of September 11th produced staggering losses of life 
and property. They also brought forth substantial private-insurance 
payouts, as well as federal relief for the City of New York and for the 
families of individuals who perished on that day. The losses suffered 
during and after the attacks, and the structure of the relief effort, have 
raised questions about the availability of insurance against terrorism, 
the role of government in providing for, subsidizing, or ensuring the 
presence of such insurance, as well as the interaction between relief 
and the incentives for taking precautions against similar losses in the 
future. In response to such losses, and in anticipation of others, one 
might imagine an array of government responses ranging from 
nonintervention, to subsidized private insurance, to after-the-fact 
government payments of a fixed or uncertain kind. 
It is our claim that the particular mix of responses the government 
has chosen with respect to 9/11 ,  including the September 11th Victims' 
Compensation Fund1 and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,2 
will significantly affect private expectations about the government's 
likely response to future terrorist attacks. These expectations will in 
turn affect future private actions, ranging from the types of insurance 
policies that will be written, to the character of real estate 
development that will take place (especially in the country's largest 
cities), and to the level of charitable contributions that will be made 
following any future terrorist attack. The causal arrow can also point 
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** Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. - Ed. We are grateful for 
comments received from colleagues at faculty workshops at the University of Michigan and 
University of Chicago, and from Dean Bachus, John Duffy, Tim Mygatt, and Bryan Ray. 
Portions of the research for this project were generously funded by the Cook and Elkes 
Funds at the University of Michigan Law School and by the many friends of the University 
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1. U.S. Air Transportation and Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000)) [hereinafter 
ATSSS Act]. 
2. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 
[hereinafter Terrorism Risk Insurance Act]. 
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in the opposite direction. Future political actors may evaluate private 
responses to the risk of terrorism in deciding on the character or 
degree of a governmental response. 
One aim of this Article is the exploration of the relationships 
between promised or expected government actions (or inactions) and 
private decisions regarding terrorism risk. These issues lead to some 
novel ideas about the role of government in insuring against terrorism 
- and then against crime more generally. In Part II we begin with 
some background on the response of the private-insurance market and 
the federal government to the losses resulting from September 11th. 
Part III looks at the positive question of how government and private 
actors should be expected to respond to the losses of 9/11 and to the 
prospect of such losses in the future. It explores the interactions 
between government relief and charitable responses to 9/11 ,  as well as 
the existence or absence of private insurance, and it draws contrasts 
between terrorism disasters and natural disasters, as well as between 
9/11 and prior terrorist attacks. Part III also analyzes the 
circumstances in which episodic relief of the 9/11 variety will lead to 
(or be replaced by) more permanent, routinized relief, as is available 
in some other countries. 
Part IV takes up the normative question of the optimal mix of 
government and private relief (including insurance) for terrorism­
related losses. It provides a skeptical view of government intervention 
in property-insurance markets generally and of the particular federal 
terrorism-reinsurance regime that Congress recently adopted. Part V 
then broadens the inquiry by arguing that, whatever one thinks of the 
case for government-sponsored terrorism compensation or insurance, 
the case for government-sponsored insurance against crime - which is 
to say a much broader set of crimes than terrorism alone - is at least 
as sound. Part VI concludes. Throughout the Article, we refer to 
"insurance" and government "relief" because specific programs and 
reactions have been in the form of insurance-market interventions and 
relief programs. But we also use these expressions to refer to 
government payments, subsidies, and liability rules more generally. It 
is the larger questions we are after, and those concern the 
government's role in preventing losses and in compensating victims 
following certain events. 
II. INSURANCE, RELIEF, AND THE EVENTS OF 9/11 
The terrorist attacks of September 11th produced an enormous set 
of losses, some insured through private markets and some not. Insured 
loss estimates range from 30 to 100 billion dollars, and include 
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property-, liability-, workers-compensation-, and life-insurance claims.3 
Much of the damage done on 9/11 to private property and private 
economic interests was insured through policies sold by insurance 
companies, although substantial damage was inflicted . on publicly 
owned facilities in lower Manhattan, including the New York City 
subway system, that were likely underinsured.4 To this we add the 
staggering loss of nearly 3000 lives,5 some completely uninsured and 
many underinsured by any plausible standards of measurement. The 
total loss dwarfs that of any other single-day disaster or insurable 
event in U.S. history, at least since the major battles of the great wars 
and the Galveston hurricane of 1900 in which 6000 people perished,6 
and rivals the losses experienced in the Kobe, Japan earthquake of 
1995, which may be the most costly natural disaster in modern history.7 
When thinking about these issues, it makes sense to separate the 
loss of property, private and public, from the loss of life and limb, in 
large part because the present mix of private and public insurance, and 
of relief generally, is different for property than it is for persons. In 
addition, government relief or compensation for lost property presents 
somewhat different moral-hazard issues than does relief for lost life; 
the politics of relief may also differ. We consider these important 
differences below. 
A. Losses to Property 
The bulk of private property losses suffered in the 9/11 attacks was 
covered by private insurers. Some claims remain in dispute, of course, 
but by and large the assets that were lost, including buildings, aircraft, 
3. See, e.g., TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 4, http://www.tillinghast.com/tillinghast/publications/reports 
(restricted page, last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Robert P. Hartwig, Insurance Information 
Institute, The Long Shadow of September 11: Terrorism and Its Impacts on Insurance and 
Reinsurance Markets, Presentation to the Insurance Information Institute (July 15, 2002), at 
http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/687221_1_0/septll.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2003). 
The largest source of variation in the estimates of insured losses appears to be the widely 
varying assessments of the amount of tort liability that will ultimately arise out of the events 
of 9/11. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra, at 4 (showing estimates of liability-insurance 
coverage of between five billion and twenty billion dollars; see also Edward Wyatt et al., 
After 9111, Parcels of Money, and Dismay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2002, at Al (detailing the 
allocation of $21.3 billion of federal aid to various programs). 
4. See infra notes 12 & 13. 
5. The official death toll from the 9/11 attack was recently reduced to 2,752. Dan Barry, 
A New Account of Sept. 11 Loss, With 40 Fewer Souls to Mourn, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 
2003, at Al. 
6. The 1900 Storm, GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY NEWS, at http://www.1900storm.com/ 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2003) (discussing the Galveston disaster). 
7. See Richard L. Holman, New Estimates of Quake Damage, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1995, 
available at 1995 WL 2109467. See generally TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra 
note 3, at 4. 
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and office contents, were insured under conventional insurance 
policies that did not (following conventional practice) exclude losses 
from terrorism.8 The federal government did and will provide some 
relief for losses of uninsured private property, but this relief often 
takes the form of subsidized loans and is small in comparison with the 
role of private insurance.9 
The picture is quite different with respect to losses to public 
property. The largest such losses associated with 9/11 in New York 
City concern damage to the subway system in lower Manhattan.10 The 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority claims that those losses will be 
covered mostly by private-insurance policies, with only relatively small 
amounts coming from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
("FEMA") and its state equivalent to fill in the gaps. 1 1  We suspect, 
however, that when all of the insurance claims have been finally 
settled and when all of the damages to public facilities (not just the 
subways) are taken into account, the amount to be covered by 
government relief dollars will represent a sizeable fraction of the total 
8. This conclusion assumes that the "war risk" exclusion will either not be invoked by 
insurers or, if invoked, will be found by courts not to apply to the 9/11 attacks. See infra 
note 36. 
9. In general, after a "major disaster" has been declared by the President (which comes 
only after state and local governments have responded and the governor of the affected state 
has requested a disaster declaration from the President), individuals and businesses that have 
suffered uninsured property losses or temporary job losses as a result of the disaster become 
eligible for loans from the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), and, in some cases, 
modest grants administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"). 
When homes have been damaged, loans can be issued for up to $200,000 and loans to replace 
damaged personal property can reach $40,000. Businesses can receive loans up to $1.5 
million to repair or replace damaged property. The loans may carry subsidized rates of 
interest, but they must be repaid in full. Individuals or families who do not qualify for these 
loans, typically those with very low incomes or no collateral, can receive up to $14,800 from 
FEMA in the form of one-time grants. Christopher M. Lewis & Kevin C. Murdock, 
Alternative Means of Redistributing Catastrophic Risk in a National Risk-Management 
System, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 51, 68-69 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999). 
See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, THE DISASTER PROCESS AND DISASTER 
Am PROGRAMS, at http://www.fema.gov/library/dproc.shtm (last updated Feb. 12, 2003) 
10. According to a report of the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
("MT A"), the most substantial damage was to the subway tunnel running 
underneath the World Trade Center Towers - the Interborough Rapid Transit lines 
numbers 1 and 9 - which will need to be completely rebuilt, and the related stations and 
infrastructure, as well as damage to the N/R Line Cortlandt Street Station. The total 
property damage to the transit system is estimated to be $855 million. See METRO. TRANSP. 
AUTH., 2002 COMBINED CONTINUING DISCLOSURE FILINGS app. A at 7-9, at 
http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/investor/pdf/2002app-a-v2.pdf/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
11. METRO. TRANSP. AUTH., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 13, 14, 18, http://www.mta.nyc.ny. 
us/mta/investor/pdf/annualreport2001.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004); METRO. TRANSP. 
AUTH., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE YEARS ENDING 
DECEMBER 31, 2001 AND 2000 , at 3, http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/investor/pdf/ 
2002annualreport_financials.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) (hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE 
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT]. 
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losses.12 Indeed, the sheer magnitude of the federal funding that has 
already been earmarked for the reconstruction and overhauling of 
lower Manhattan strongly suggests that the federal government will 
end up bearing a substantial portion of the lossesY 
Apart from the physical damage to property, many New York 
businesses also experienced substantial monetary losses in the 
aftermath of 9/11 .  Focusing solely on the businesses in and around the 
World Trade Center site, the lost profits during the period of recovery 
and reconstruction have been undoubtedly enormous. Indeed, the 
total private-insurance payouts for "business interruption" coverage 
12. This suspicion is justified by the available evidence. While the total property losses 
to the subway system are estimated to be $855 million, the MT A apparently has submitted 
only $685 million in insurance claims for 9/11-related property losses. Apparently, the 
difference may be attributable to the actual subway cars that were destroyed and that were 
not insured. Another suggestive (though certainly not dispositive) piece of evidence is that 
the MT A, in its 2000-2001 financial statements, did not include any amount for expected 
insurance recovery because the "Authority is pursuing the resolution of various 
contingencies with the insurance providers." COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
REPORT, supra note 11, at 39. What this means, of course, is that the insurers may interpret 
the relevant insurance policies somewhat differently than the MT A does. In addition, 
however, one would expect a general tendency for municipalities to underinsure given the 
prospect of FEMA (or Department of Transportation ("DOT")) relief. 
13. A total of twenty-one billion dollars of federal funds has been allocated for the New 
York recovery effort. See Press Release, Office of Management and Budget, OMB Releases 
Updated Summary of Government Expenditures Directly Related to September 11th 
Attacks (Sept. 10, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2002-61.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2004). Of that amount, $5.5 billion is designated for reconstructing, replacing, 
overhauling, and upgrading the infrastructure damaged by the attacks. Press Release, Office 
of Management and Budget, President Submits $27.1 Billion Emergency FY 2002 
Supplemental Appropriations Request, Provides Resources for the War on Terrorism, 
Homeland Security and Economic Recovery (Mar. 21, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/pubpress/2002-16.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004). Of that amount, $4.55 billion will 
apparently go to transportation-related infrastructure expenditures - $2.75 billion coming 
from FEMA and another $1.8 billion coming from DOT. The money will be jointly 
administered by FEMA and the U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Transit 
Administration. Edward Wyatt, Money for Just Some of a Transit Wish List, N.Y. nMES, 
Aug.13, 2002, at B4; see also Charles V. Bagli & Randy Kennedy, Old or New? Debate Rages 
Over Transit Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at Bl; Press Release, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, FEMA and FTA Announce Aid To Revamp 
Transportation Network For Lower Manhattan (Aug. 12, 2002), http://www.fema.gov/news/ 
newsrelease.fema?id=5529 (last visited Apr. 12, 2004). Although much of this money may be 
used to "upgrade" the subway system in lower Manhattan, such an improvement over New 
York's prior transportation situation can be viewed as only partial and incomplete 
compensation for the economic losses suffered by the city that were never covered by private 
insurance - such as the huge loss of tax revenues due to the drop in tourism and business 
flight out of the city. Moreover, the rest of that $5.5 billion is designated for "restoration and 
reconstruction" of certain highways and local roads "damaged by the September 11th 
terrorist attacks," to "rebuild utility infrastructure destroyed as a result of the September 
11th terrorist attacks," and to assist Lower Manhattan Development Corporation's efforts to 
"rebuild Lower Manhattan." Office of Management and Budget, supra. The rest of the $21 
billion includes the costs for the rescue and recovery efforts that immediately followed the 
attacks and the massive cleanup costs in the ensuing months, as well as the anticipated 
amounts of FEMA and SBA grants and loans. This $21 billion is separate from the $5 billion 
allocated to the Victim Compensation Fund, the $8 billion allocated to airline subsidies, the 
$35 billion for Homeland Security, and the $30 billion for the "war on terrorism." Id. 
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are expected to be larger for 9/11-related lost profits than for any 
previous single-day event, amounting to more than twenty-five percent 
of all private-insurance payouts related to the 9/11 losses.14 Despite 
this insurance coverage, however, and despite the presence of federal 
grants and loans for some business losses,15 it must be the case that 
huge financial losses that can be directly attributed to the attacks will 
go uncompensated.16 To be sure, some of these losses are private 
rather than social losses because some of these losses are offset by 
gains to other businesses located far from Ground Zero. This 
distinction may matter when it comes to encouraging governments to 
take precautions or when structuring optimal insurance policies, but it 
seems safe to proceed from the assumption that there were substantial 
uninsured social losses associated with the interruption and 
destruction of business caused by the attacks. 
In sum, we might think of the 9/11 physical property losses as 
having been effectively insured whether through private insurance or 
government relief, but regard other property-related financial losses as 
having been only partially insured. This summary, and much of the 
discussion below, intentionally bends the idea of insurance to include 
government relief. Insurance and relief are obviously not the same -
one may be expected by contract while the other depends on politics 
and circumstances. But inasmuch as governments can subsidize 
insurance or offer insurance without requiring premiums, and because 
private parties can come to expect relief in some circumstances, it can 
be useful to fold insurance and relief into one package. 
B. Losses to Life 
As for loss of life, it is almost certain that a large number of those 
killed on 9/1 1 were uninsured or underinsured.17 Although there are 
no publicly available data on this issue, the likelihood that many of the 
victims had only small life-insurance policies, or none at all, is 
14. Press Release, Insurance Information Institute, 9/11 and Insurance, One Year Later 
Terror Attacks Most Complex Disaster in History (Sept. 5, 2002), 
http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press.635680/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2004). 
15. 13 C.F.R. § 123.3 (2002), available at www.sba.gov/Iibrary/cfrs/13cfr123.pdf 
(explaining disaster loan program for business losses). 
16. See Diane Levick & Matthew Lubanko, What Price, Terror?; for Insurers, Stalled­
Business Claims Complicate Picture, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 25, 2001, at Dl (estimating 
business interruption claims in the range of $15-25 billion, compared to the total estimate of 
all 9/11 claims of $40-72 billion); Christian Murray, Adjusting to Disaster Strains Claims 
Team; Despite Heartbreak, Some Payouts Must End, NEWSDA Y, Nov. 6, 2001, at A42 (noting 
the industry had received $16.6 billion of business interruption claims to date). 
17. Jason Bram et al., Measuring the effects of the September 11 attack on New York City, 
ECON. POL'Y REV. - FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., Nov. 1, 2002, at 6 ("Although private 
insurance is expected to cover a portion of these losses, it is not likely that all of the workers 
had taken out private life-insurance policies."). 
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overwhelming. For one thing, underinvestment in life insurance is a 
pervasive problem.18 Although many households purchase life 
insurance, few purchase enough to maintain their standard of living 
should a primary earner die prematurely.19 Moreover, the main 
motivation for the large amount of charitable giving, as well as the 
Victims' Compensation Fund, discussed below, was the realization 
that many of the victims were uninsured or underinsured.20 Still, many 
of the deceased did have some life insurance or were covered by 
pension benefits payable upon death (or both).21 
In addition, immediately following 9/11 there was an 
unprecedented amount of charitable giving aimed at compensating, or 
at least assisting, the families of deceased victims.22 The other primary 
source of compensation for victims' families is the September 11th 
Victims' Compensation Fund, established by Congress shortly after 
the disaster.23 Under this unprecedented program, the families of 
individuals who suffered physical injury or death in the 9/11 attacks 
can apply for fairly generous benefits.24 If they elect to do so, however, 
18. See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should 
Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
19. Id. 
20. Of course, the definition of full or adequate coverage is highly subjective. The 
"optimal" amount of life insurance for any given family on the life of an earner depends not 
only on the income level of the earner, but also on the expectations with respect to what the 
surviving dependents' standard of living should be if the insured earner dies. For example, to 
what extent, if at all, will the surviving spouse be expected to work additional hours to make 
up for the loss of income? And to what extent will the family's savings be considered a self­
insurance reserve of sorts? These are questions that each family must answer for itself. 
21. The Special Master of the Fund, Kenneth Feinberg, has published a very small 
sample of payout profiles, including the amount of the award, the individual's annual income 
and number of dependents, and the collateral offset (which includes life-insurance proceeds). 
Although no strong conclusions can be drawn from such a small sample, which was probably 
not randomly selectea, it provides support for the idea that at least some of the victims had 
significant amounts of life insurance. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CLAIMANT AWARD 
SUMMARIES (Dec. 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/award_summaries.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2004). 
22. AM. RED CROSS, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: UNPRECEDENTED EVENTS, 
UNPRECEDENTED RESPONSE 6 (Sept. 2002) (reporting that the American Red Cross's 
Liberty Fund had by September 11, �002 received roughly $1 billion in donations, 
approximately $800 million of which was to be distributed by the end of 2002), 
http://www.redcross.org/press/disaster/ds_pr/pdfs/arcwhitepaper.pdf (last visited Apr. i2, 
2004). Interestingly, according to one news report, the bulk of those funds were designated 
for the families of firefighters, police officers, and other rescue workers who perished. Thus, 
according to this story, the average charitable award to the families of slain or severely 
injured firefighters and rescue workers was just over (and the amount to families of police 
officers just under) $1 million. By contrast, the average charitable payout to the families of 
other victims was around $146,000. Martin Kasindorf, Big Gaps Found in 9111 Benefits, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 19, 2002, at IA. These amounts do not include any amounts received from 
insurance policies, pension payments, or the Victims' Compensation Fund. 
23. ATSSS Act, supra note 1. 
24. See U.S. Department of Justice, Compensation for Deceased Victims; Award 
Payment Statistics tbl.1, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensationlpayments_deceased. 
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the payouts they receive from the Fund must, under the collateral­
offset provision of the statute, be reduced dollar for dollar by the 
amount of life insurance or other death benefits to which they are 
otherwise entitled - though not by the amount of charitable gifts 
received.25 As is customary, however, none of these life-insurance 
policies or pension-policy death benefits that were in effect contained 
clauses requiring the reduction of death benefits in the event of third­
party or other insurance payments. The presence of private insurance 
therefore reduced or eliminated the payments from the Fund that 
might have been made to the families of some victims, and in turn may 
have increased the pool of funds (and thus the payments) available to 
the families of other victims. 
Another unusual aspect of the Fund is the requirement that 
claimants forego tort litigation with respect to their losses, at least 
insofar as the most obvious potential domestic defendants are 
concerned.26 Thus, a family cannot accept a payment from the Fund 
and then seek to recover from an airline, an employer, an owner or 
builder of a collapsed building, engineers who designed the buildings, 
and so forth.27 Suits against construction firms or designers of buildings 
are of course still possible if brought by claimants who do not collect 
from the Fund, or if brought by the City of New York or by businesses 
or property owners affected by the attack. Suits against foreign 
organizations and tortfeasors are of course possible, and are 
enthusiastically reported in the news.28 
To summarize, the families of individuals who lost their lives in the 
9/11 attacks may receive payments from one or more (but not all) of 
the following sources: the Victims' Compensation Fund (assuming 
they waive their tort rights and, once again, subject to reductions 
corresponding to amounts recovered under existing life-insurance 
benefits), third-party tort defendants (either because they choose not 
to collect from the Fund or because they pursue foreign tortfeasors 
html (updated daily) (reporting median award as of Apr. 12, 2004 to be $1,435,349). Note 
also the tax relief provided by Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), which 
curiously extends the tax benefits to those injured in both the Oklahoma City bombing and 
the anthrax attacks, but not to the victims of the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing. 
25. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2003). For a thorough discussion of the collateral-offset 
provisions in the Fund, see Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: 
Collateral Sources Under the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 591 (2003). 
26. ATSSS Act, supra note 1, § 405(c)(3)(B). 
27. 28 C.F.R. § 104.61 (2003). 
28. See Henry Weinstein, $15 trillion 9111 lawsuit adds Saudi royals as defendants, CHI. 
TRJB., Nov. 23, 2002, at 10 (reporting that a fifteen trillion dollar lawsuit now includes 186 
defendants). 
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relentlessly), charities, and life insurers (under contracts that 
conventionally contain no collateral-offset provisions). 
C. The Effects on the Insurance Industry and the Federal Response 
Despite the vast magnitude of the insured life and property losses, 
there seems to be little doubt that most life insurers and property 
insurers will be able to meet their financial obligations arising out of 
the events of 9/11 .  As for the life-insurance market, the number of 
insured deaths was not so great as to threaten instability among 
insurers. Nor will the demand for life-insurance policies disappear; 
individuals will hardly cease to purchase policies merely because 
policy ownership will likely cause a reduction in government relief 
following (the very unlikely event of) death as a result of terrorism. To 
the contrary, although there are no hard data on this, we suspect that 
the events of 9/11 encouraged a short-term run on trusts and estate 
lawyers' services and perhaps a temporary surge in the market for life 
insurance as well. 
The property-insurance market is apparently more easily ruffled. 
A few of the less well-capitalized reinsurers may yet become insolvent 
as a result of 9/11-related property losses (much as some firms 
collapsed following Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge 
Earthquake ) ,29 but the overall solvency of the property-casualty 
insurance industry is not in doubt.30 The uncertainty is with respect to 
the availability of terrorism coverage in the future and, in turn, the 
possibility that there will be less building, or less building in some 
locations and of certain types of properties, not simply because 
insurance premiums rise accurately in response to newly understood 
threats, but rather because insurance markets will not adjust smoothly 
to the post-9/11 world. 
Immediately following 9/11 ,  a number of commentators and 
industry officials expressed concerns about an impending "crisis" in 
terrorism insurance. It was widely reported that international 
reinsurers were planning to insert broad terrorism exclusions in their 
new policies and that these exclusions would be applied as old policies 
came up for renewal. Primary insurers would in tum seek permission 
from state regulators to insert similar exclusions in their policies. The 
ultimate effect, or so the argument went, would be to cause disruptions 
in the mortgage lending and commercial real estate markets. 
Commercial lenders would be reluctant to issue loans - or would 
29. Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, INS. ISSUES UPDATE, Aug. 2002, 1995 WL 628905 
("Eleven property-casualty insurers became insolvent due to Hurricane Andrew (10 in 
Florida and one in Louisiana) and others were financially impaired."). 
30. See TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 3. 
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demand compensation in the form of exorbitant interest rates - in the 
absence of insurance coverage for terrorism-related losses. 
Based on these concerns, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002,31 which, as we will see, is similar to the British 
system for dealing with terrorism risks to property.32 Under this new 
regime, the federal government will provide reinsurance for ninety 
percent of all property-casualty losses attributable to "acts of 
terrorism" (as determined by the Secretary of Treasury), but only to 
the extent that the aggregate losses fall between $10 billion (rising to 
$15 billion over three years) and $100 billion.33 By introducing 
government reinsurance, this program radically alters the 
public/private mix of insurance and compensation for terrorism­
related property risks. In effect, it makes the federal government the 
terrorism reinsurer of last resort. We discuss the related issues of 
whether this type and degree of federal intervention was called for and 
what the relevant justifications might be in Part IV below. 
Ill. TERRORISM INSURANCE, CHARITABLE GIVING, AND EPISODIC 
GOVERNMENT RELIEF 
We tum now to the question of what sort of compensation, 
insurance, and charitable developments should be expected in the 
event of another major loss from terrorism, given recent events. The 
question may seem little more than a thought experiment, though 
there are safe and interesting predictions to be made. Our analysis 
includes a comparison of terrorism-related disasters with natural 
disasters and incorporates the interactions among private insurance, 
public relief, and charitable giving in the two contexts. One of our 
predictions is that, as with natural disasters, public and charitable 
relief will more likely be forthcoming if there is (or is perceived to be) 
less than full private insurance. In this Part we also explore the 
question of why 9/11 prompted such unprecedented amounts of relief 
- especially in the form of the Victim's Compensation Fund - and 
whether future attacks should be expected to do the same. Along the 
same lines, we consider the unpleasant possibility that what began as a 
series of terrorist attacks might expand into a long-term war, resulting 
in political pressure to shift from a system of episodic relief to a more 
systematized and permanent compensation regime. 
31. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2. 
32. See infra Part III.C.2. 
33. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 103( e ). 
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A. Private- and Public-Insurance Responses to Another Attack 
There is every reason to think that, in the event of another attack 
on U.S. soil, and especially one aimed at a civilian target, significant 
government-provided compensation would again be forthcoming, even 
though the attacks experienced before 9/11 did not produce such aid. 
One reason for this prediction is the Victims' Compensation Fund 
itself and the precedent it now represents. It is conceivable, however, 
that the political and emotional underpinnings of the Fund would fail 
to reappear if terror-related losses became common. Indeed, it is 
something of conventional wisdom to say that the 9/11 attacks were a 
historic event of the worst kind, and that the reactions to it should also 
be understood as singular. But the case seems to be stronger for the 
prediction that the Fund would serve as a kind of precedent for relief 
following future attacks, much as the substantial federal appropriation 
that followed the Alaskan earthquake of 1964 is thought to have been 
the first of what then became a series of relief plans.34 What is 
interesting about this example for the present situation is not the 
legislative history but the emerging pattern, in which victims of new 
disasters point to recent precedents to strengthen their own claims for 
government relief. 
And this pattern of relief should come as no surprise. Natural 
catastrophes attract media attention and political interest, in part 
because of the dramatic and vivid stories of woe that they produce. In 
addition, there is the effect of geographic concentration; that is, 
natural disasters typically hit only a well-defined fraction of the 
country and of the economy, creating the quintessential concentrated 
and politically effective interest group. In any event, this attention 
attracts charitable interest as well as governmental funds, although, as 
discussed more fully below, the extent to which the victims will be seen 
as sympathetic to mainstream voters, and hence politicians in other 
parts of the country, depends importantly on the extent of uninsured 
rather than insured losses.35 
We would expect a similar dynamic to play out to an even greater 
degree if there were to be another terrorist attack or a series of such 
34. In the twenty or so years following that earthquake, legislators who sought disaster 
relief for their home states readily pointed to the Alaskan example, where there was relief 
after a significant but not unprecedented quake. See DOUGLAS C. DACY & HOWARD 
KUNREUTHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL DISASTERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL 
POLICY 54-57 (1969); Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its 
Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 ,  18-19 (1996). 
35. We do not, of course, assume that voters generally are aware of how much property 
or life-insurance coverage the average household has. Rather, the idea is that the calls for 
relief will be more likely to come from those who do not have other sources of 
compensation, and that it will be the pleas (and stories) of the uninsured victims that will get 
the most (and most effective) play in the media and with politicians, and then perhaps with 
voters. 
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attacks. Terrorism, after all, draws in the entire nation in a way that 
natural disasters do not. This is because an attack from abroad, 
including a pronouncement or history of animus toward the country as 
a whole, is seen as one aimed at the integrity or confidence of all 
citizens. Thus, just as Pearl Harbor was considered an attack on the 
entire nation and not just an attack on the state of Hawaii, so too a 
terrorist attack on U.S. soil (perhaps especially one carried out by an 
attacker who is or is perceived to be a "foreign combatant") would be 
considered an attack on the U.S. people and government. A natural 
disaster will trigger a weaker reaction than an enemy assault; 
hurricanes do not hit Florida because it is a part of the United States, 
whereas terrorists struck New York and Washington precisely for 
what they signified about our nation. 
Indeed, part of what may have motivated the Victims' 
Compensation Fund was the feeling that the losses suffered on 9/11 
were no different from losses caused by the attack of a foreign 
sovereign, thus putting them in the category of losses appropriately 
addressed by the federal government.36 Political parties, economists, 
and citizens may disagree as to the proper scope of the federal 
government, but national defense is on everyone's list of governmental 
functions, and it is only one additional step to the idea that the federal 
government ought to be responsible or generous where losses are 
incurred because of a failure of this federal function.37 This leap from 
failed protection to generous compensation may be primarily an 
emotional reaction rather than a logical progression, but it helps to 
explain the comfort with federal relief following 9/11 .  
36. The Israeli example i s  instructive here. When the Israeli Parliament first adopted its 
terrorism compensation regime, discussed more fully below, the primary rationale was the 
notion that any losses experienced by individuals or particular families as a result of the 
terrorist war on the Israeli government and people as a whole should be spread across all of 
its citizens. See Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation for Harm Caused by Terrorism: 
Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. REV. 335, 336-39 (2003). Of course, 
whereas viewing the attack on 9/11 as an "act of war" against the U.S. government and its 
people may have increased the willingness of Congress to enact a generous compensation 
regime, such an interpretation of events would tend to undermine the argument for private­
insurance coverage for those losses, since most insurance policies contain "war-risk" 
exclusions. Interestingly, almost immediately following the 9/11 attack, several of the largest 
property-casualty insurers publicly stated their intention not to invoke the war-risk 
exclusion. This may have been a patriotic gesture, or it may have represented a savvy legal 
judgment that, under prevailing case law, the war-risk exclusion would not likely apply in the 
9/11 case anyway. See Pan Am. World Airways v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d 
Cir. 1974). 
37. We do not mean to imply that a government function need always be encouraged 
by compensation in the event of failure or even disappointment, because governments 
are often disciplined by political checks and other means. But compensation is surely more 
easily explained or defended where losses are incurred because of government failure, or at 
least where it is the government rather than a private party that might have best prevented 
the loss. 
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Indeed, it is just this sort of visceral reaction to the 9/11 attacks, 
together with the inspiring example of the rescue workers running into 
the burning towers (and perhaps the suppression of stories about the 
misdeeds of a very few rescue workers), that may explain the 
extraordinary level of charitable giving both in terms of money and 
volunteer efforts, including the extraordinary increase in blood 
donations.38 In fact, the only periods in U.S. history of comparable 
charitable involvement have been during times of war when American 
citizens rallied together to battle a foreign enemy.39 
The other major factor that may lead to substantial government 
relief for victims of terrorism-related disasters is the predictable 
pattern connecting uninsured losses, public sympathy, and government 
relief. This link builds on the following fact: public sympathy following 
a disaster will almost certainly be more intense, and hence the political 
determination to provide relief funds will be greater, to the extent 
there are uninsured victims. It is, of course, those victims who will 
most likely come to the attention of voters through media coverage, 
personal or political relationships, and other channels.40 If a disaster 
largely creates victims who already have private insurance for their 
losses, there is apt to be less sympathy and therefore a lower 
probability of public or charitable relief. The idea is that politicians 
will respond less readily to pleas for help from those who are known to 
have other sources of compensation.41 
It is noteworthy that the existing disaster-relief programs always 
condition relief on the absence of insurance coverage. For example, 
Farm Service Agency and Small Business Administration low-interest 
loans to eligible individuals, farmers, and businesses who suffer 
damaged property is conditional on the absence of insurance. 
Similarly, FEMA grants to cover certain expenses are conditioned on 
an absence of insurance coverage.42 
The overall picture comes with something of a cynical gloss; relief 
requires a sizeable group of sympathetic beneficiaries who, ideally, are 
also politically coordinated or appealing to the media, which increases 
the likelihood of a major disaster declaration. If a disaster creates 
victims who are insured, however, there is apt to be less sympathy and 
therefore a lower probability of monetary relief, because politicians 
38. See AM. RED CROSS, supra note 22. 
39. Notably, the attack on Pearl Harbor did not give rise to the enactment of a 9/11-type 
compensation fund for the victims of that attack. One reason for this might be that there 
were relatively few civilian deaths and relatively little damage to non-government property. 
40. Levmore, supra note 34, at 18-19. 
41. Id. See generally David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal 
Disaster Policy Since 1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHIC RISK 307 (Kenneth A. 
Frost ed., 1999) (detailing the growth of the federal budget allocations for disaster relief). 
42. 44 C.F.R. § 206.110, 206.113 (2003). 
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who are considering special appropriations will respond more readily 
to pleas for help from those who have no other source of 
compensation. Given this relationship between uninsured losses and 
the likelihood of government relief, an incentive is created among 
individuals and businesses not to purchase insurance (or to purchase 
less-than-full insurance) against disaster losses.43 A final implication is 
that this dynamic at the margins may affect "real" - and not merely 
insurance - decisions. For example, the expectation of federal relief 
has almost certainly increased the willingness of some individuals and 
businesses to locate or remain in disaster prone areas. This sort of 
moral hazard actually increases the risk of the hazards being insured 
against. 
It is possible that there will be a similar perverse interaction 
between government relief and charitable giving for future terror 
victims. For example, having observed the magnitude of charitable 
giving following 9/11 ,  government officials may be inclined to be less 
generous in the event of a future attack. It may be that the memory of 
the remarkable outpouring of charity for the victims of 9/11 will 
dampen the federal government's willingness to appropriate large 
amounts of relief aid for victims if and when the next terrorism-related 
disaster occurs. Alternatively, rather than reducing relief payments, 
Congress might, in a future version of the Victim Compensation Fund, 
explicitly include charitable contributions on the list of collateral 
sources to be offset against any relief award. 
Of course,  the effect may run in the opposite direction as well. 
Having seen how generous the federal government can be when there 
is an extraordinary foreign-based attack on American soil, potential 
donors may reduce their contributions in future cases, relying on the 
government to do the job once again. And if contributions were to 
diminish (or were expected to diminish) in this way, there would be 
even more political pressure for the government to provide relief. 
Similarly, one might imagine that charities would then focus their 
attention on victims whose losses went uncompensated by government 
relief or private insurance; charities could in this way fill in the 
43. Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief of Risk, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
167 (1991) (modeling how government insurance for various risks, including disaster risks, 
distorts individual incentives). Note that, because government disaster relief is dispersed 
only in the event of a declared "major disaster," private insurance is, from the insured's point 
of view, a better buy for small-scale than for large-scale disasters. More precisely, an 
insurance purchaser should be willing to pay more for insurance against a given expected 
loss that is not likely to be covered by government relief (for example, a loss associated with a 
small-scale disaster) than she would pay for the same expected loss that is expected to be 
reimbursed, at least partially, by the government. This conclusion assumes that insurance 
companies would not lower their price-per-unit of insurance to take account of likely large­
scale disaster coverage. If they could - and they would in a perfectly competitive market -
then both the coverage for the small-scale and the coverage for the large-scale disasters 
would be priced at actuarially fair rates. 
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coverage gaps and also signal where future government relief might be 
directed. How all of these interacting influences will ultimately play 
out remains to be seen. 
Another factor that might lead to a reduction in both government 
benefits and charitable relief following future terrorism disasters is the 
perception that, for all the recollections and evidence of tragedy and 
heroism, a significant number of affected families emerged with more 
wealth than before the attacks - and stories of outright fraud will also 
continue to appear. If such stories remain salient, one can easily 
imagine that congressional policymakers and potential donors would 
be reluctant to replicate the unprecedented generosity following 9/1 1 .  
W e  have already emphasized the importance o f  the extent of 
uninsurance or underinsurance as related to the amount of likely 
government relief. Given this relationship, one might reasonably ask 
how significant the underinsurance problem will be in the future for 
terrorism-related risks. As to life insurance, it seems highly unlikely 
that even the unprecedented generosity of the 9/11 Fund's payouts will 
affect future life-insurance-purchasing decisions. With respect to 
property insurance, questions of insurability and underinsurance are 
more complex. We take up these questions in Part IV below and find 
both that the uninsurability problem has been exaggerated, and that 
the new federal property-casualty reinsurance program may not be 
terribly effective. In particular, when individuals and businesses can 
decline the new terrorism coverage, as they can under the new law, the 
program may actually end up contributing to the underinsurance­
followed-by-relief cycle. In any case, in the event of a future attack, 
there will likely be room for a federal-program response similar to the 
response engendered by the attacks on 9/11.  A somewhat different 
question is raised by the prospect of a protracted war against civilian 
targets, rather than another isolated terrorist attack, and we take up 
this question in Part 111.C below. 
B. What Made 9111 Different from Previous Terror Attacks? 
A related but distinct comparative question is why the 9/11 attacks 
triggered so much more government relief than did previous terrorist 
attacks. Put differently, once compensation for terror-related losses 
was placed on the table, why was the program not expanded to include 
benefits to victims of the earlier World Trade Center bombing, the 
Oklahoma City bombing, or the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, which 
killed a number of U.S. sailors? 
Part of the answer lies in a simple reference to scale. Many more 
people died on 9/11 than in any of the previous terrorist attacks. The 
earlier attacks also affected fewer uninsured parties. In the case of 9/11 
there was a huge loss of uninsured life, not because of terrorism 
exclusions, but because of simple underinsurance problems resulting 
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from myopia, overoptimism, bad planning, or passivity on the part of 
persons who are unlikely to purchase insurance coverage above what 
is provided through their employment contracts. Given what we know 
about patterns of life-insurance purchasing generally, approximately 
three thousand sudden deaths would almost certainly generate a 
significant number of uninsured or underinsured lives. Moreover, 
given that some lower-income households may view life insurance as a 
luxury, it is likely that the underinsurance problem may even be worse 
among the relatively low-income workers who worked at the World 
Trade Center.44 
At the same time, the amount of uninsured and underinsured 
damage to New York's infrastructure and businesses created 
immediate and overwhelming (and probably desirable) political 
pressure on the President and Congress to commit federal funds to 
rebuild and reinvigorate the city, which in turn may have had an effect 
on victim relief initiatives. Put directly, it might have been politically 
difficult to transfer large amounts of money for property damage or 
other economic losses without also doing much for the families of 
those who were killed in the attack. In contrast, the families of the 
sailors killed on the U.S.S. Cole received some payments from the 
government as a matter of course, because all members of the armed 
forces are covered by modest death benefits.45 Moreover, in the case of 
the U.S.S. Cole, there was no need to assemble a political coalition to 
legislate a strategy for replacing the lost property. Inasmuch as such a 
repair is obviously a better investment than is the abandonment of the 
ship, the vessel was probably repaired either with funds found in the 
ordinary budget for naval operations or through a special 
appropriation. Somewhat similarly, in the Oklahoma City case, there 
was no large-scale damage to state and local infrastructure, but rather 
the destruction of a building owned by the federal government itself. It 
is likely that the lives lost in that tragedy included few who were both 
uninsured, or dramatically underinsured, and in position to support a 
family.46 
44. The countervailing effect, however, would be that the normal, government-provided 
life insurance - paid out through the Social Security Survivorship program to dependents of 
qualifying workers - would provide a higher percentage income replacement for low­
income than for high-income recipients. 
45. Currently the government will pay a "death gratuity" to the surviving heirs of 
military personnel killed on active or inactive duty. See 10 U.S.C. § 1475, 1478 (2000). 
Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, 117 Stat. 1335. Most military 
personnel also participate in the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance program ("SGLI"), 
which provides $250,000 of coverage. The premiums are automatically deducted from the 
servicemember's pay, unless they elect for a lower amount of coverage. See Armed Forces 
Services Corporation, Servicemember's Group Life Insurance Benefits, at http:l/www.afsc­
usa.com/sgli.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003). 
46. Many of those killed in the Oklahoma City bombing were federal employees who 
participated in the Federal Employee Group Life Insurance Program. Basic coverage is at 
least $10,000 and most employees are automatically enrolled. Optional coverage is available 
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The 9/11 attacks did great harm to a workplace that naturally had 
many breadwinners who in turn left families that claimed our 
sympathy. Oklahoma City took the lives of fewer heads of households; 
the death of children upsets us as much as anything, but it does not 
produce circumstances that seem much improved by the appropriation 
of money. In short, it is unsurprising that Oklahoma City families 
eventually received but modest tax relief, while the 9/11 Fund 
provided quite substantial direct payments. 
Although these distinctions can help us to predict when and where 
after-the-fact government relief will be forthcoming, they do not solve 
the puzzle entirely. Had the political picture been slightly different, 
the 9/11 Fund might have been expanded to include families affected 
by the earlier terrorist attacks, with the same collateral-offset 
provisions to limit the coverage to uninsured losses only. In this way, 
the relief would have flowed mostly to sympathetic, uninsured, or 
underinsured families. Indeed, it is possible that this sort of retroactive 
expansion may yet occur in the event of another attack, but it is 
doubtful, if only because of the obvious line-drawing problems. If the 
benefits were expanded to include the families of the victims of the 
World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, it seems difficult 
to justify excluding the U.S.S. Cole victims and then the victims of the 
contemporaneous anthrax attacks and so on. Of course, difficulty in 
drawing lines is not the same as impossibility; nevertheless, it might be 
thought easiest and safest for the federal budget simply to draw a 
bright line between pre- and post-9/11 events, so that future terrorist 
attacks might be treated along the lines of the 9/11 model with no new 
relief for losses caused before that infamous day. 
Again, we do not mean to insist that one can examine tragedies as 
they occur and always predict the character and magnitude of 
subsequent relief. If the 9/11 relief package had required a few more 
votes in Congress, for example, or a political appeal to the hinterland, 
one can easily imagine the last-minute inclusion of the families of 
victims of the Oklahoma City blast. A politician might then have 
emphasized the expense of constructing a new federal building in 
Oklahoma City, and while legislating funds for that reconstruction or 
for a memorial to be built on the site of that blast, it might have 
seemed unfeeling to provide nothing for lost lives.47 In the event of 
up to five times the employee's annual salary. See Office of Personnel Management, Federal 
Employees' Group Life Insurance Program, at http://www.opm.gov/insure/life/FAQs/FAQs­
l.htm (last updated March 13, 2003). Victims also received modest compensation from the 
Murrah Crime Victims Compensation Fund. The original ambitions of this fund never 
materialized, however, and its benefits were limited to $10,000. See Gary Fields, Oklahoma 
City Aid not Reaching Victims, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 1995, at 3A. 
47. One argument for including victims of the first World Trade Center bombing might 
have emphasized the similarity of the attackers' origins and motivations with those behind 
the 9/11 attacks. 
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another tragedy, and assuming as we are now that such a tragedy 
would give rise to ex post relief in accordance with the 9/11 model, 
there would likely be attempts of j ust this sort to include the families 
of victims of past terrorist attacks and perhaps the victims of wars and 
wrongs experienced long ago. Indeed, it is noteworthy that although 
Oklahoma City victims were not included in the 9/11 package, they 
were eventually provided with modest assistance in the Victims of 
Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001.48 These attempts to equate 
tragedies, in the sense of using one disaster or relief effort as 
precedent for another, may succeed - but they may also unwittingly 
bring about the collapse of political coalitions and hence of relief along 
the lines of the 9/1 1 Fund. For example, if the next terror attack in the 
United States were to provoke calls for 9/11-like levels of 
compensation, the coalition of political forces that supported the 9/11 
Fund as a one-time occurrence may, owing to the prospect of excessive 
cost, fail to reconstitute. 
In any event, we maintain our basic claim that a future large-scale 
terrorist event will almost certainly generate ex post relief of the sort 
that followed 9/1 1. A further prediction is that the precise shape of the 
episodic relief will, as always, hinge on the pattern of insured and 
uninsured losses. 
There is an alternative explanation for the generous compensation 
regime that followed 9/11 that deserves as much consideration as one 
that emphasizes uninsured losses. Recall that beneficiaries who file for 
benefits under the Fund must waive most of their rights to sue in tort.49 
The primary and intended beneficiary of that provision is almost 
certainly the airline industry.50 The airline industry was, for obvious 
reasons, among the hardest hit by the events of 9/11. Demand for 
tickets dropped, there was an immediate spike in airline insurance 
premiums, and, by some reports, the available insurance policies 
removed coverage for losses caused by terrorism. Congressional 
reactions to this state of affairs, and to the fear of airline bankruptcies 
48. Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
PUBLICATION 3920: TAX RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS (2002), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3920.pdf (summarizing tax benefits made available to victims 
of 9/11, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the 2001 anthrax attacks). Under this provision, 
the qualifying survivors of those attacks are exempt from income tax for the year of attack 
and the previous year, with the minimum refund being set at $10,000. Thus, even those who 
owed no income taxes in a given tax year will be considered to have paid $10,000 in income 
tax in that year, and will receive a $10,000 federal tax refund check. See id. at 5. Interestingly, 
these tax relief checks will not be treated as a "collateral offset" under the 9/11 Victim 
Compensation Fund. See ATSSS Act, supra note 1; 28 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2003). 
49. ATSSS Act, supra note 1, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i). 
50. Raymond L. Mariani, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and 
the Protection of the Airline Jndustry: A Bill for the American People, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 
141 (2002); Lizette Alvarez, A Nation Challenged: The Bailout; An Airline Bailout, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at Al. 
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and economic disaster, included the Air Transportation Safety and 
System Stabilization Act's provision of cash transfers,s1 loans,s2 
insurance subsidies,s3 and safeguards from litigation to the airline 
industry.s4 Given the generosity of the benefits available to the families 
of victims through the 9/11 Fund, and the requirement that recipients 
waive the right to litigate, this waiver requirement provides great value 
to the airlines.ss This is not the place to explore the question of 
whether under the principles of our tort system the airlines ought to 
have feared the legal aftermath of 9/11 .  A respectable argument can 
be made that in the absence of obvious negligence and in the presence 
of other potential defendants who could have been linked to the 9/11 
losses under some theory of negligence or strict liability (focusing on 
the failure to reinforce cockpit doors or to design buildings in a 
different manner, for example), the only thing to fear was the 
inclination of some juries to move money to sympathetic victims. But 
it is possible that the waiver idea was critical to post-9/11 relief and 
that this disaster is different from most others.s6 And to the extent that 
the 9/11 Fund is therefore seen as nothing more than such an industry­
specific and episodic subsidization scheme - accompanied by 
compensation for victims' families in order to maintain appearances 
perhaps - there is not much to say about future relief. Industry 
bailouts are episodic in their own way and in any event do not suggest 
a move toward routinized relief. 
C. From Episodic Relief to Permanent (Routinized) Compensation 
The discussion of public and private responses to future terrorist 
attacks has assumed to this point that future attacks would be rare, 
even if devastating. If, however, the 9/11 attacks prove to be the 
beginning of a protracted conflict involving numerous events that 
produce losses of life and property on American soil, then 
expectations would likely change. Calls for generous episodic relief on 
51. ATSSS Act, supra note 1, § 101(a)(2) (calling for payments of up to $5 billion for 
losses due to ground top order following attacks of 9/11 ). 
52. Id. § lOl(a)(l) (authorizing up to $10 billion in loans). 
53. Id. § 201(b) (authorizing temporary subsidies for increased cost of airlines-insurance 
coverage). 
54. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i). 
55. The other protection for the air transportation industry in the Act was a provision 
limiting the airlines' tort damages arising out of 9/11 to the amount of liability insurance in 
force at the time of the attacks. See ATSSS Act, supra note 1, § 408. 
56. Although one can, with respect to Oklahoma City and the earlier World Trade 
Center bombing, begin to imagine potential tort defendants, none of those defendants can 
make as plausible a case as could the airline industry post-9/11 that an entire and critical 
industry was in jeopardy - at least in the sense of being threatened with enormous 
transaction costs as firms reorganized or closed and new owners of old aircraft emerged. 
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the order of the 9/11 Fund payouts might help to fuel a preemptive 
political move to adopt a more permanent regime of compensation, 
though with more modest benefit levels. Another potential political 
justification for such a regime would be the idea of boosting public 
morale by establishing a framework in which all citizens and taxpayers 
must share somewhat in the burdens of war. In addition, such a regime 
might be considered a valid response to the failure of (or gaps in) the 
private-insurance market. Although private insurers may be able to 
function amidst a full-scale war - that is, they may be able to cover 
war-related risks in return for high premiums - a society that is 
involved in a full-scale war is likely to find itself with numerous 
insolvent insurers, and then with customers who are unwilling to rely 
on private insurance because of the risk of insurer insolvency.57 
Thus, if it becomes clear that a long-term war is at hand, involving 
a substantial risk of recurring strikes on the U.S. mainland, substantial 
government involvement in providing terrorism compensation directly 
to victims seems likely. In this Part, we discuss this possibility, and we 
draw lessons from the examples of Britain and Israel. 
1. To What Extent Is the Current U. S. Relief Regime "Permanent"? 
As a preliminary matter, we should note that there already exists a 
permanent federal program that provides some relief from the 
economic losses caused by any disaster the President declares a "major 
disaster," including terrorism-related disasters. That relief comes in 
the form of loans and grants following property damage, both private 
and public;58 but these funds are available only after the governor of 
the state in which the disaster has occurred makes the required 
disaster declaration and the President follows with a similar 
declaration. In an important sense, then, the existing regime of 
government compensation for disaster-caused losses to property is 
largely ad hoc or episodic, except to the extent that these disaster 
declarations are largely predictable.59 With respect to terrorism-related 
losses specifically, there are some existing federal programs (enacted 
57. At that point, of course, an unassisted market might respond through a consortium 
of insurers. This solution, however, would likely prompt some government involvement, as 
regulatory constraints on monopolization would need to be relaxed (to allow for the 
increased risk sharing among insurers) and greater oversight of premiums exercised. 
58. See supra note 9. 
59. The exception to this pattern is flood insurance. Under the National Flood Insurance 
Program ("NFIP"), there are predetermined floodplain areas in which property owners are 
eligible to purchase federally subsidized flood insurance. Thus, once such coverage is 
purchased, there need be no disaster declaration for property owners to be able to recover 
on their policies. If, however, the property owner in a floodplain area fails to purchase flood 
coverage, or underinsures, and wishes to receive a FEMA grant or SBA loan, the disaster 
declaration is necessary and relief is episodic. See infra text accompanying notes 79-82 for 
further discussion of the NFIP. 
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well before 9/11), that provide modest compensation for victims of 
terrorist attacks. For example, following the Iranian hostage episode 
and a number of other terrorist attacks in the 1980s, Congress created 
a regime that pays a small amount of compensation to certain victims 
of terrorism.60 Under this program, citizens who are held hostage by 
terrorists receive a stipend of fifty dollars for each day that they are 
held in captivity,61 and there is a small death benefit paid to the 
families of victims who are killed by terrorists.62 
2. When Terrorism Turns to War: Lessons from England and Israel 
It is fairly easy to imagine that repeated attacks or a prolonged war 
on U.S. soil would create enormous political pressure to expand the 
rather paltry terror-compensation benefits described in the previous 
Part. A transition of this sort occurred in both Great Britain and 
Israel, although the resulting programs in those countries differ 
significantly from each other. 
In Britain during the Second World War, Churchill famously set 
forth the notion that the British people should share in the economic 
hardships imposed by the war. Incessant bombings, targeted at 
civilians and urban centers, threatened to demoralize the country, and 
part of the idea behind Churchill's message was to reflect the 
conviction that the entire nation was joined in the struggle as one.63 Of 
course, no system could fully equalize the burdens of war, and no 
attempt was made to impose equal sacrifice following deaths in a 
family, whether on the battlefield or in London. But the law that was 
passed, The War Damage Act of 1943, did provide compensation for 
war damages to property that occurred between September 3, 1939 
and October 1, 1964.64 Though the "risk period" during which the Act 
60. This regime is primarily the result of two different Acts of Congress: The Hostage 
Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-449, 94 Stat. 1967 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5561 note 
(2000)), and The Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 801-05, 100 
Stat. 879 (codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C. § 5569 note (2000)). 
61. 5 u.s.c. § 5569(d)(l). 
62 5 U.S.C. § 5569(f)(l)(c). These modest benefits are paid only to individuals 
employed by or similarly related to the U.S. government. Kimberly A. Trotter, 
Compensating Victims of Terrorism: The Current Framework in the United States, 22 TEX. 
INT'L L.J. 383, 392 (1987); see also Deborah M. Mostaghel, Wrong Place, Wrong Time, 
Unfair Treatment? Aid to Victims of Terrorist Attacks, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 83, 90-94 (2001). 
63. Winston Churchill determined "that it was 'unfair for British society to place the 
entire burden of the destruction on those unlucky enough to be hit.' " See Sommer, supra 
note 36, at 338 (quoting Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 881, 888 n.3 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2000), affd, 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001)). 
64. War Damage Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 21 (Eng.). Half of the funds for this Act 
came from a new tax on landowners and the other half came from general welfare funds. Id. 
An earlier piece of similar legislation is the War Risk Insurance Act of 1939, which 
authorized the Board of Trade to "undertake the insurance of ships and other goods" and to 
"requir[e] persons to insure goods against certain risks in time of war." S.M. KRUSIN & P.H. 
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was to apply ended in 1964, the Act was eventually repealed in its 
entirety in 1981 .65 Following this repeal, the only remaining provision 
of government property insurance was the "Pool Re" scheme, which 
we discuss below in connection with the new U.S. terrorism-risk­
insurance program.66 
Personal injuries were also included under the British war­
insurance regime. The Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act 
of 1939 made "provisions as respects certain personal injuries 
sustained during the period of the present emergency."67 This scheme 
was not limited exclusively to military personnel, but rather applied to 
all "gainfully occupied persons . . .  and [to] persons of such other 
classes as may be specified in the scheme."68 The program still remains 
in force and is maintained by the Secretary of State under the Personal 
Injuries (Civilians) Scheme 1983.69 
A full-scale war on the U.S. mainland, comparable to the situation 
in Britain during World War II, is almost impossible to imagine given 
the current state of world affairs. More imaginable would be a series of 
coordinated terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and against U.S. interests and 
citizens around the world. The obvious analogue to such a 
hypothetical is the state of war in present-day Israel, and indeed that 
country has adopted a permanent terrorism compensation regime that 
seems relevant for our purposes. 
Israeli law provides a system of direct compensation by the 
government for civilian losses of life and limb, and for losses of 
THOROLD ROGERS, THE SOLICITORS' HANDBOOK OF WAR LEGISLATION 296 (1940). For 
examples of specific compulsory insurance orders, see the second volume in this series. 2 id. 
at 417, 972-3 (1942). The War Damage Act of 1941 set up the War Damage Commission to 
oversee the "making of payments in respect of war damage." Id. at 975. The Commission 
issued a series of ordinances that made participation in this insurance scheme mandatory, 
but, as the war grew, the act became increasingly complex. Eventually, the War Damage Act 
of 1943 consolidated the various rules of the Commission, but maintained the ordinances 
promulgated under the earlier War Risk Insurance Act. 5 MAURICE SHARE & S.M. KRUSIN, 
THE SOLICITORS' HANDBOOK OF WAR LEGISLATION 321 (1944). Section l(l)(b) of the new 
Act required "contributions by persons interested in land towards the expense of making 
such payments." Id. at 321, 377 (detailing the various levels of compulsory insurance 
required from different industries). 
65. Statute Law (Repeals) Act of 1981 (Eng.). 
66. See infra Part IV.B. 
67. The "period of the present emergency" extended to March 9, 1946. Personal Injuries 
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1939, 2 � 3 Geo. 6, c. 82 (Eng.). 
68. Id. 
69. Personal Injuries (Civilians) Scheme, (1983) SI 1983/686 (Eng.), amended by 
Personal Injuries (Civilians) Scheme, (2002) SI 2002/672 (Eng.). The payment amounts are 
modest compared to the Victims' Compensation Fund, amounting at most to a few hundred 
pounds a week, depending on one's degree of disability. The base compensation to a widow 
or widower is ninety-two pounds a week. Despite the fact that the rate schedule is updated 
annually, the amounts have changed little, if at all, since 1983. Id. at 2108 sched.2. 
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property due to terrorist attacks.70 The level of compensation is 
middling, much lower than that provided by the 9/11 fund but much 
more than that expected from charitable collections or from the 
U.S. legislation that followed the Iranian hostage crisis. Medical care 
is provided, and lost earnings are partially replaced up to a middle­
class standard.71 We might think of the Israeli system for compensa­
ting terrorism losses as comparable to the worker's compensation 
program found in the United States, but of course this program does 
not presently extend its benefits from the place of work to the place 
of war.72 
The Israeli regime grew out of a wartime scheme that sought to 
spread the burdens of war across the population. The idea behind the 
expansion of the war-loss compensation regime was that terrorist 
attacks were essentially an extension of the wars that Israel had been 
fighting, and, just as acts of war were directed at Israel as a country (so 
that the rhetoric or politics of burden-sharing was found attractive), 
acts of terrorism were also directed at the Israeli people as a whole.73 
American history and politics do not much resemble Israel's, but 
terrorist attacks, and recent anthrax and sniper attacks, have affected 
the nation as a whole, whereas most other crimes have not. It is not at 
all difficult to imagine that more attacks on U.S. soil, perhaps 
producing salient uninsured losses, would create the will or political 
opportunity to think of the nation as involved in a protracted war, or 
to expand our scheme for compensating members (and families of 
members) of the armed services to include all victims of terrorism.74 
The details of this sort of scheme, and the relative generosity of these 
imagined routinized benefits would depend, no doubt, on the mood 
70. Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 1970, 24 LS.I. 131, (1969-70) (providing 
compensation for bodily injury suffered in terrorist attacks as well as compensation for 
families of deceased victims); Property Tax and Compensation Fund Law, 1961, 15 LS.I. 
101, (1960-61) (providing compensation for property damage caused by terrorism). 
71. The only English source we have been able to find describing the benefits available 
under the Israeli compensation regime is the article by Hillel Sommer. Our very brief 
summary of these benefits derives entirely from that article. See Sommer, supra note 36, at 
343-51 nn.41-100 and accompanying text. Sommer states that his description of the program 
was compiled "from a variety of formal and mostly informal sources." Id. at 343 n.41. 
72. Id. at 343-51 nn.41-100 and accompanying text. The Israeli payouts for personal 
injury or death are generous compared to other types of social welfare benefits in Israel 
(and, certainly, in the United States), but substantially smaller than the benefits offered 
under the 9/11 Victims' Compensation Fund. Injured victims receive state-provided medical 
care, disability benefits during the period of treatment and recovery, and additional amounts 
designed to assist their reentry into the workplace. The families of victims killed by terrorist 
attacks receive monthly survivorship benefits (based on the salary of a mid-level government 
employee) as well as payments for some incidental expenses. With respect to property losses, 
the Israeli government essentially acts as an insurance company, paying to replace or repair 
property damaged or destroyed in a terrorist attack. Id. 
73. Id. at 353-54. 
74. See supra note 45 (reviewing the military compensation scheme). 
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created by the final precipitating events, on the level of social 
insurance that is otherwise available,75 and on the question of whether 
these routinized benefits are cast as a substitute for, or a supplement 
to, episodic ex post relief. 
3. Expanding Routinized Terrorism Compensation in the U.S. 
If a regime of permanent, routinized terrorism relief were adopted 
in the U.S. (and here we focus on compensation for loss of life) , we 
would expect such relief to provide only for uncompensated or 
uninsured losses.76 This structural spine of any relief system - the 
limitation of benefits to uninsured losses - is what sustains public 
sympathy for the relief effort, even as it serves the function of reducing 
moral hazard. The pervasiveness of this principle can be seen not only 
in the collateral-offset provisions of the 9/11 Fund and in the 
uncompensated-loss requirements of federal disaster relief programs 
more generally, as discussed above, but also in such legal doctrines as 
the insurable interest requirement and the principle of indemnity in 
insurance law.77 
There is, therefore, reason to expect that the adoption of a 
permanent regime of terrorism compensation would reduce, though 
not eliminate, episodic relief payouts of the sort seen in the 9/11 Fund. 
Once such a regime is known to be in place, there would be relatively 
little political pressure for after-the-fact relief. The same argument 
extends to private contributions as well. If citizens knew that some 
level of compensation would be paid to families of terror attacks, 
charitable giving would likely decrease. There are other examples of 
this phenomenon in the private sector. For example, when an 
individual within a workplace experiences a sudden family crisis or 
unusual emergency, coworkers may contribute money to a fund to 
help the person through the difficult period. But such informal ex post 
mutual-insurance arrangements are rare with respect to illnesses or 
deaths that are known to be covered by insurance that is provided 
75. In the United States, of course, we have a variety of domestic social insurance and 
employment schemes to use for comparison, and other countries have compensation systems 
that are more directly comparable. 
76. See infra Part IV.B., where we discuss the government's routinized response to 
terrorism-related property losses. 
77. This point is emphasized in Abraham & Logue, supra note 25. The principle of 
indemnity says that an insurance policyholder should never receive more than full 
compensation for a given insured loss. One example of this principle is the doctrine of 
insurable interest, which holds that an insurance policy is valid only to the extent the insured 
will suffer a loss if the property (or person) insured is destroyed or harmed. ROBERT H. 
JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 295 (3d ed. 2002). The principle of indemnity 
in general, and the doctrine of insurable interest in particular, are intended to combat moral 
hazard. 
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through the workplace.78 Similarly, politicians do not sponsor or obtain 
government payouts for the families of military personnel killed in 
battle, as these families are known to receive death benefits, albeit 
modest ones. 
It is unlikely, however, that the adoption of a routinized terror 
compensation system would bring ex post episodic relief to an end, in 
part because it is impossible to predict the scale of a disaster. Thus, 
even if a routinized regime were in place, another major terrorism­
related disaster could produce enough uninsured losses, public 
sympathy, and interest group influences to bring about yet another ad 
hoc response. An example of this dynamic can be seen in the 
application of the National Flood Insurance Program ["NFIP"] .79 The 
NFIP is a routinized regime of sorts, funded in part by American tax 
dollars and in part through premiums paid by the insureds, and 
administered by private-insurance companies.80 Under this program, 
the U.S. government in effect subsidizes the ex ante purchase of flood 
insurance by those who live in floodplains.81 Thus, when a flood 
occurs, there is a permanent and routinized regime in place that 
provides scheduled compensation without regard to the level of 
sympathy generated by a particular flood. Nevertheless, serious floods 
inevitably create losses that are uncovered by this insurance as many 
floodplain property owners still do not buy flood coverage, and the 
ensuing public sympathy creates pressure to provide additional ex post 
relief. Indeed, once there is enough of a public outcry to produce a 
declaration of a disaster, the relief to uninsured losses automatically 
begins to flow via FEMA and related programs.82 
78. Somewhat similarly but tangentially, in a workplace with an employee pension fund, 
it is less likely that a retirement is accompanied by a voluntary and sizeable monetary 
payment from the employer or from fellow employees. Substantial voluntary payments to 
retiring employees became a thing of the past once formal and planned retirement plans 
came into being. 
79. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (1968) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 note (2000)); The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. 
L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975 (1973) (codified at various sections in 42 U.S.C). 
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4015, 4016, 4017 (2000) (providing for creation of National Flood 
Insurance Fund for compensating qualified flood losses and funded via premiums, bond 
issuances, and congressional appropriations). 
81. See also Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING 
THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 125 (1998). See generally Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Introduction to 
the National Flood Insurance Program, at http://www.fema.gov/nfip/intnfip.shtm (last 
updated Jan. 13, 2004). Although flood insurance is marketed through private-insurance 
companies, it is underwritten by the federal government and funded out of general tax 
revenues. 
82. Flood victims in designated floodplains are supposed to get only one free bite at the 
ex post disaster relief apple. That is, if an individual applies for flood-disaster relief and then 
does not purchase and maintain flood insurance thereafter, that person is by law supposed to 
be barred from receiving any future flood-disaster relief. Thus, with a homeowner who fails 
to purchase flood insurance initially, then receives flood-disaster relief when a major flood 
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Still, the presence of the in-place compensation regime would 
likely reduce the size and extent of any such relief; after all, many do 
buy flood insurance. Therefore, the combined outcome may be an 
overall reduction of total payouts to victims.83 That possibility 
increases the political attractiveness of such a regime, if we can assume 
that voters are sufficiently well informed and sophisticated to 
appreciate the way in which it might deflect the sympathy factor and 
thereby avoid add-on compensation.84 
If the class of taxpayers/voters and the class of potential terror 
victims are overlapping but not identical groups, perhaps because 
some regions but not others are thought to be primary terrorist 
targets, the rational actor and political pictures just described become 
fuzzier. Those who live in high-risk areas might prefer to rely on 
episodic relief, as they count on ex post sympathy to maximize their 
recoveries. The majority of citizens might oppose this plan, but they 
are too poorly organized to precommit the country to a system with no 
ex post episodic relief, though they may be able to organize 
sufficiently to push for routinized relief - with the expectation that 
episodic relief will be rare once the basic relief package is in place. At 
the same time, even citizens in high-risk areas will recognize that 
moderate attacks may not yield ex post relief. The victims of the first 
World Trade Center bombing may yet get some compensation for 
their losses, but they have gone many years with no relief. These 
victims or families may turn out to be worse off than they would have 
been with a regime of permanent compensation. But if they come to 
be included in a relief package, or had they been included in the 9/1 1 
Fund as they almost were, they will be better off. In sum, citizens as a 
whole may favor routinized relief; some because the overall payouts 
will be lower once sympathy can be reduced, and others because they 
occurs, and at that point fails again to buy flood insurance, the bar from receiving relief is 
implicated. 42 U.S.C. § 5154(a); see also FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, MANDATORY 
PURCHASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 4 (Sept. 1999), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/mandpurl.pdf [hereinafter FEMA FLOOD INSURANCE 
GUIDELINES]; Pasterick, supra note 81, at 153. Although there is no data on this question, 
we would predict that public sympathy and interest-group pressure would make enforcement 
of that restriction very difficult. And, of course, to the extent that flood insurance does not 
cover the full extent of the flood losses, such relief will likely be forthcoming. 
83. The other potential benefit of moving from a system of purely episodic relief to a 
system of permanent routinized compensation (or, more likely, to a blended system) is that if 
legislation is drafted with no specific victims in view, it is possible that precautions against 
fraud and other problems are easier to set in place. 
84. Of course, the sympathy factor might also be deflected in other ways. If more 
victims, for instance, were fully insured through private markets, this would eliminate or 
reduce the need for a compensation regime in the first place. Thus, an alternative to 
routinized direct compensation might be government subsidies for insurance purchases, see 
infra Part IV, although even that approach seems unlikely to eliminate the possibility of 
some level of ex post relief, as some uninsureds will always remain. 
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prefer routtmzation m order to ensure coverage in the event of 
unspectacular losses. 
Long delays can also contribute to the uncertainty of relief. 
Consider the episodic relief that eventually came to Japanese­
Americans who were interned during World War IL These reparative 
payments came only after many years and only when the class of 
surviving and sympathetic internees was on the verge of disappearance 
because of natural deaths. The precipitating cause seemed to be the 
age of these survivors or the geographical loyalty or political 
inclinations of the sitting President rather than the spread of news 
about the suffering of this class.85 Moreover, other tragedies and 
wrongs have yielded no relief. In short, generous ex-post sympathy­
enhanced benefits may come at the price of substantial uncertainty 
and even delay. At some point the delay makes the payments symbolic 
and political, rather than compensatory or influential, because 
expected charges are too far off to influence the behavior of any 
political or other actor. 
Much of this will seem familiar to readers who have thought about 
relief and reparative programs, and so it may be useful to stress that a 
remarkable thing about the 9/11 Fund is that it offers generous 
payouts even though most of the persons who were killed could have 
been expected to carry life insurance, payable even for deaths caused 
by terrorism. We have already suggested that the destruction of so 
much uninsured or underinsured property, along with the desire to 
insulate the airline industry from lawsuit, are the real keys to 
understanding the development and scope of the 9/11 Fund. The 
modest life insurance that most firefighters carry may also have 
contributed to the sympathy, the charity, and thereby to the Fund, 
though of course we do not find similar relief following the death of 
one or several firefighters in the line of duty. The point is that it might 
have been politically impossible to establish a Fund that covered 
property - including such property as New York City's infrastructure 
- and not persons. 
In any event, if a routinized regime of terror compensation were 
adopted, it is almost certain that the benefits would have to be 
significantly reduced. The level of payouts expected from the Fund -
averaging approximately $1.9 million per claimant after collateral 
offsets86 - could not be sustained in a long-term conflict involving 
many such attacks. In a sense, then, the creation of such a Fund, and 
the unprecedented generosity of the payouts, reflect an optimistic 
85. Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 
1687-90 (1999). 
86. U.S. Department of Justice, Compensation for Deceased Victims; Award Payment 
Statistics (Dec. 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments_deceased.html 
(last visited May 5, 2004). The median award, as of May 5, 2004, is $1.47 million. 
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assumption that business will go on as usual. If attacks became more 
regular, however, and the move to a routinized regime were to occur, 
fiscal responsibility would require that benefit levels be set lower -
perhaps something closer to the minimally compensatory levels of 
either the Israeli model or something approaching what the families of 
American soldiers receive. Sadly, this change might in turn send a 
pessimistic and alarming signal to an already rattled citizenry, as the 
reduction in benefits would represent a modest sort of defeat. 
All of this is not to say, however, that it would have been politically 
wiser to structure the 9/11 Fund as a permanent regime from the 
beginning. That approach would have made it more difficult to secure 
the funds for New York's rebuilding effort and would have 
immediately raised the vexing question of whether to include only 
attacks on American soil and/or attacks on American citizens. In 
addition, it would have raised the issue of retroactivity in a more 
serious way. That is, with the admission that a comprehensive, 
permanent terror compensation regime was necessary, it would have 
been much more difficult to draw a clear line between pre-9/11 and 
post-9/11 terror attacks. Relief for a given flood or earthquake does 
not necessarily bring with it serious pressure to return to earlier, 
perhaps smaller disasters in order to treat victims with equal 
generosity and sympathy. Once a set of events are linked to a common 
enemy in what is s·een as a single conflict, however, it is unlikely that 
relief can be kept episodic. 
What is more, these and related questions would have distracted 
from the more important tasks at hand following the attacks. If these 
matters - the questions concerning the proper amount of benefits and 
who should be entitled to receive them - must be confronted in the 
future, it will be during a period of dramatic national mobilization, at a 
time when interest groups, politicians, and civil libertarians, who all 
sometimes make too much of these somewhat arbitrary lines, will 
either be more willing to compromise or more easily marginalized by 
the majority. 
IV. THE OPTIMAL MIX OF GOVERNMENT RELIEF AND PRIVATE 
INSURANCE 
We turn now to the more normative side of the terrorism­
insurance question - the issue of the optimal mix of government and 
private relief (including insurance) for terrorism-related losses. Some 
discussion of the various justifications for government intervention in 
the private-terrorism-insurance market is a necessary part of this 
analysis. Included will be our critique of the "insurance crisis" 
rationale for the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 and our 
assessment of arguments for subsidizing, in one way or another, the 
private-terrorism-insurance market. 
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A. Of Exaggerated Crises, "Uninsurable" Risks, and the Case for (and 
Stronger Case Against) Government Intervention 
We have already described the apparent, or perhaps opportunistic, 
panic in the insurance industry following the attacks of 9/11 and the 
claim that those attacks had rendered terrorism risks, especially risks 
to certain types of high-profile properties, essentially "uninsurable. "87 
These concerns culminated in the enactment of the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002, which radically altered the public-private mix 
with respect to terrorism-risk compensation.88 Some time has now 
passed since the early prophecies of doom in the insurance markets, 
and a good case can be made that terrorism-related property risks 
never in fact became permanently uninsurable. 
Even before the enactment of the new legislation designed to 
stabilize the property-casualty insurance · market, there were private 
insurers willing to cover terrorism risks, albeit at rates substantially 
(and understandably) higher than those that prevailed pre-9/11.89 
Moreover, past experience and sound insurance theory tell us that any 
insurance problem produced by 9/11 is, in the long run, either modest 
or nonexistent. Whatever insurance-availability problems appeared in 
the period immediately following the attacks were probably 
manifestations of temporary capacity constraints caused by the 
unexpected claims on industry-wide reinsurance capital. Such effects 
are similar to those that followed the unusually large natural 
catastrophes in the early 1990s, which were also temporary.90 Thus, 
even without government intervention, as new capital entered the 
market in response to the new demand for terrorism insurance, 
coverage would likely have become more readily available and prices 
would have fallen, though obviously not down to the level of pre-9/11 
premiums.91 
Of course, it may well be that the property-insurance market for 
terrorism risks did undergo a permanent change (even with the 
adoption of the federal regime), in the sense that standard commercial 
property policies may henceforth contain broad terrorism exclusions. 
87. See supra Part 11.C. 
88. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2. 
89. Jennifer Caplan, Political Risk: Run For Cover?, CFO.COM, at http://www.cfo.com/ 
Article?article=6557 (Jan. 22, 2002) ("(T]he private political risk insurance market, 
particularly Lloyd's, is already offering stand-alone terrorism coverage."); Katherine 
Griffiths, U.S. Army Turns to Lloyd's for Cover Against Terror Attacks, INDEPENDENT 
(London), Feb. 19, 2002, at 15; Joseph B. Treaster, Insurers Find Profit in New Risk 
Consciousness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 3, at 4 (describing new profitability of "political 
risk" coverage). 
90. Anne Gron & Alan 0. Sykes, A Role for Government?, REGULATION, Winter 2002-
2003, at 44, 51 (arguing against a governmental role in the terrorism-insurance market). 
91. Id. 
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Those who wish to secure terrorism coverage for their properties will 
then need to buy separate and expensive terrorism policies or secure 
terrorism coverage through existing "political risk" policies.92 But such 
a change is not necessarily a sign of market failure; to the contrary, it 
might be a sign that the private-insurance market is working 
reasonably well. Market segmentation of this sort is common for 
earthquake and hurricane insurance, and there may be good reasons 
for it. For example, some insurers may have a comparative advantage 
in insuring such risks, while others may be particularly ill-suited to do 
so.93 Customers may also prefer choice rather than the bundling of 
insurance products. 
Another lasting effect of 9/11 on property insurance and real estate 
markets may be a significant increase in insurance premiums and 
perhaps a reduction in the availability of coverage for certain kinds of 
properties, such as skyscrapers and other high-profile landmarks, and 
certainly for anything built at Ground Zero. This difficulty may reflect 
the sensible judgment of the market regarding relative risks; some 
properties carry a much larger terrorism risk than others. The market 
may judge such structures to be too attractive a target for terrorists or 
for copycat criminals, and hence insurance for those properties 
without some government intervention may truly be unavailable at a 
price any investor would pay. Moreover, there may be no sound 
reason for the government to overrule this judgment with a subsidy or 
mandate. That is, it is not obvious that the country's morale or the 
overall health of the economy requires the construction of new one­
hundred-story skyscrapers to replace those that were lost. It is even 
possible that the current public debate over the future of the World 
Trade Center site itself is influenced by a common understanding that 
it would be foolhardy to reproduce what was there, because it would 
offer too tempting a target for terrorist attacks. If, however, politicians 
are determined to intervene in this market (as seems to be the case), 
the government could simply promise insurance at low cost to 
buildings built at Ground Zero if it deems reconstruction at that 
location worthwhile for the national psyche or because of beneficial 
externalities related to reconstruction of the area and those related to 
the deflection of attention from other landmarks. 
92. See Pasterick, supra note 81;  FEMA FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES, supra 
note 82. 
93. Gron and Sykes note a comparative advantage rationale for this sort of market 
segmentation. They first observe that, with respect to catastrophic risks such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes, and now terrorism, the only insurers that can effectively provide coverage are 
either those with enormous capital reserves of their own or those with efficient access to 
reinsurance capital. Thus, they note that AIG, the best-capitalized insurer in the world, was 
the first to come back and offer ground damage coverage for the airlines, a type of coverage 
that the government had stepped in to supply in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 .  Gron & 
Sykes, supra note 90, at 48-49. 
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Existing skyscrapers in New York and in other cities may have 
become more difficult to insure, but this problem is one of 
redistribution rather than efficiency.94 That is, inasmuch as these 
buildings have already been constructed, a sudden reduction in 
insurance availability has the effect of reducing the wealth of the 
buildings' owners and, depending on supply and demand elasticities, 
perhaps the wealth of the tenants as well. But the inability to insure 
existing properties would have little effect on investor or tenant 
incentives. This redistributive effect may be exacerbated by the 
disinclination of tenants to locate or remain in certain skyscrapers. It is 
difficult to think of this as a market failure except to the extent that 
the market fails to sort workers quickly into firms according to their 
willingness to be employed in skyscrapers. In any event, insurance is 
unlikely to solve this problem. 
Thus, the uninsurability claim in our view is overstated, and the 
move to specialized terrorism insurers is likely an efficient one. It is 
furthermore our intuition, and it is the view of some other market­
oriented commentators,95 that, even without .the new federal terrorism­
insurance regime, the terrorism-reinsurance market would have 
bounced back as quickly and as fully as the natural-disaster 
reinsurance market did following the earthquakes and hurricanes of 
the 1990s. These conclusions, however, do not prove the absence of a 
market failure to which the government might usefully respond. 
Terrorism risks may be different from natural-disaster risks in ways 
that suggest a potential role for the government as reinsurer or excess 
insurer. Thus, a familiar argument heard in support of the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act was that terrorism disasters are uniquely 
unpredictable, so that intervention was necessary because the pricing 
of insurance is especially problematic for the private market.96 There is 
something to this argument, in that terrorists, unlike hurricanes, 
intentionally seek to thwart prediction. Terrorists exploit the element 
of surprise not only to avoid capture but also to maximize the 
destabilizing effect of their attacks. 
94. Note that these buildings might even serve as decoys or diversions of some value to 
other structures. This phenomenon is closely analogous to the well-known diversion effect 
that arises when individual property owners engage in differing levels of private but 
observable precaution-taking. Steven Shaven, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: 
Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 1 1  INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991) (showing, 
among other things, that the individual incentive to divert crime away from oneself and to 
others may lead to socially excessive private precaution-taking in some circumstances). 
95. Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 647 
(2002). 
96. This view of the unpredictability of terrorism risks was incorporated into the 
congressional findings in the preliminary parts of the Act itself. Pub. L. No. 107-297, 
§ 101(a)(4), 1 16  Stat. 2322 (2002) ("Widespread financial market uncertainties have arisen 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11 ,  2001, including the absence of information 
from which financial institutions can make statistically valid estimates of the probability and 
cost of future terrorist events . . . .  "). 
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Although this is a difference between terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters, it may not be an important one. There is no reason to expect 
that the presence of intentional human agents makes the risk 
inherently impossible to calculate. Many insurance policies cover risks 
associated with intentionally caused harms, and this does not typically 
present a problem so long as the intentional harm is not caused by the 
insureds themselves. Large, sophisticated insurers can reduce the 
initial uncertainty associated with terrorism risks by employing 
terrorism experts, mathematicians, and game theorists to construct 
models that reduce terrorism risks to something that is calculable.97 
Competition among insurers would then drive premiums to the 
actuarially correct level. To . some extent, again, this is already 
happening. Thus, we might be encouraged (and somewhat alarmed) 
when we see terrorism-insurance premiums skyrocketing for the 
Golden Gate Bridge and other national landmarks - encouraged, 
because the focus on these targets may mean that security will improve 
through competition and government activity, and yet alarmed that 
these risks are presently thought to be substantial.98 
The case for government intervention is fueled by another 
difference between terrorism and natural disasters, namely the 
location of expertise and information about these risks. In the case of 
potential terrorist attacks, the government has powerful intelligence­
gathering capabilities that no private insurer can muster - and this is 
the sort of information that the government will not readily share with 
insurance companies. Although it is easy to imagine an information­
sharing partnership between the public and private sectors with 
respect to natural disasters (so that meteorological and seismological 
data might, for example, be exchanged), such an arrangement is 
difficult to imagine with respect to terrorism.99 This difference between 
97. There is some evidence that the country's mathematicians are beginning to get 
involved in the business of terrorism prediction, albeit not expressly on behalf of insurance 
companies. According to an interview on National Public Radio with Stanford 
mathematician Kevin Devlin, there was a recent meeting of mathematicians in Washington, 
D.C., to discuss just such types of research. According to Devlin, mathematicians may be 
able to employ Bayseian inference techniques to narrow down the universe of possible 
terrorist targets and disaster scenarios. Interview by Scott Simon with Kevin Devlin (NPR 
Weekend Edition radio broadcast, May 18, 2002) .  
98. According to one report, almost immediately after 9/1 1, the insurance premiums for 
the Golden Gate Bridge doubled, even though policy limits were drastically cut. Jane 
Weaver, Paying Terror's Premiums (MSNBC television broadcast, Apr. 29, 2002), 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3073488/ (Apr. 29, 2002). 
99. Although it is difficult to imagine the government sharing its intelligence regarding 
terrorist targets with private insurers, the reverse - using private-insurance markets to 
produce useful information for the government - is certainly conceivable. Indeed, the short­
lived plan to create a market in "terrorism futures" would have produced a version of this. 
The idea there was to generate new sources of reliable information regarding when and 
where the next attack would occur by letting people - including (it was hoped) some people 
with exceptionally good private information on the issue - essentially bet on the question, 
and thereby profit from their information. When the program was made public, however, 
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natural and human-made disasters might at first appear to suggest a 
reason for government intervention in the manner of the British 
system, in which the government is a reinsurer rather than a primary 
insurer.100 But the reasoning is weakened by the realization that if the 
government conceals information in the interest of national security, 
then it is unclear how the government will be able to use that very 
same information in designing and pricing its own brand of terrorism 
insurance.101 Observers who value the behavioral effects that market 
pricing can produce will thus be slow to approve of government 
involvement in this arena. 
On the other hand, there may be sound reasons for the 
government to offer reconstruction encouragements in the guise of 
insurance subsidies in the post-9/11 world. It is easy to see that once a 
business district is destroyed (especially if destroyed by terrorism, 
domestic riots, atrophy, or other causes that may be expected to 
continue or recur), there will be a disinclination among private 
investors to be among the first to rebuild in the area. Many businesses 
thrive on a critical mass of activity. In these circumstances, 
governments can do some good by leading the way with investments in 
infrastructure and even incentives for early rebuilding.102 No doubt this 
point could be exploited by politicians and private groups seeking 
special treatment, and in a world with flawed governments and 
overachieving interest groups, the best policy may be to avoid favoring 
some building plans over others. We will proceed, however, with the 
presumption that when the destroyed area is near major ports, 
transportation hubs, accumulations of human capital, and dense 
residential areas, it is likely that rebuilding is socially desirable and 
that the private market might rationally and strategically await 
government interventions to pave the way. In this context, what 
appears as uninsurability may, in fact, be nothing more than a 
reflection of strategic behavior emanating either from the supply side 
there was an outcry among commentators and politicians, leading to a decision by the 
Defense Department to end it. One of the main concerns was that terrorists themselves 
might, either directly or indirectly, be able to profit from the program. See Reuven Brenner, 
A Safe Bet, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2003, at AS. 
100. On the British system, see infra Part IV.B. The Israeli example is not a reinsurance 
scheme, rather, the coverage is provided directly, and citizens are included involuntarily. See 
Sommer, supra note 36, at 343-50 (describing benefits under Israeli program). 
101. Gron and Sykes make a similar point about the likelihood that the government will 
charge premiums that are not based on actuarial calculations. See Gron & Sykes, supra note 
90, at 49. 
102. This was the logic of the now expired Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance 
Act of 1968, the Federal Crime Insurance Program, and other systems promulgated under 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb to 1749bbb-21, to encourage business investment in riot-stricken areas. 
See Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257, 303 n.250 (1985). For a fuller discussion of these programs, see infra 
note 131. 
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or the demand side, or both, as property insurers and real estate 
interests attempt to induce government aid. Nevertheless, it is at least 
plausible that government money can be efficiently expended to 
encourage the formation of a critical mass of business activity in 
Manhattan and the surrounding area. 
One obvious problem with the new federal terrorism-reinsurance 
program as a response to the first-mover problem, however, is that the 
program seems much broader than necessary to provide a subsidy for 
the reconstruction of privately owned buildings in New York. The 
program could have been limited to reinsuring the risk of terror 
attacks in New York, if the primary goal were to provide a 
reconstruction subsidy rather than a construction subsidy. Of course, 
there is an obvious political explanation for why Congress would not 
enact a federal-reinsurance program that would apply only to one 
state, when there is at least a plausible case to be made that terrorists 
will next strike someplace other than New York. Such an ex ante 
program, by its nature, will almost have to be made generally 
applicable to be politically feasible, since all voting j urisdictions can 
imagine themselves (rightly or wrongly) needing such a subsidy. This 
observation is entirely consistent with the provision of ex post relief 
directed at New York only. There, the understanding is that if other 
states suffer a terrorist attack, they will receive similar relief.103 
B. The Federal-Reinsurance Program 
We turn next to a more careful analysis of the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act, which again seems to be based, albeit rather loosely, on 
the British model. Again, we should emphasize that the new terrorism­
reinsurance program is mainly (and perhaps exclusively) a subsidy for 
property-insurance markets, as was the British system on which it 
appears to have been modeled.104 The British system, unsurprisingly, 
was also adopted in response to increased terrorist activity. When 
stepped-up IRA bombings caused most reinsurers to withdraw from 
insuring property risks within the British Isles in 1993, the British 
103. Another potential justification for the subsidy for terrorism insurance relates to the 
diversion effect mentioned supra note 94. If it is thought that individual property owners will 
engage in inefficient private precaution-taking of the sort that mainly diverts the attention of 
terrorists to the building next door rather than truly deters, then there is an argument for 
government subsidized insurance to reduce this externality. DARIUS LAKDAWALLA & 
GEORGE ZANJANI, INSURANCE, SELF-PROTECTION, AND THE ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM 
(Nat'I Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9215, 2002), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9215. This argument acknowledges, of course, that the optimal 
level of private precautions is non-zero, and may be substantial. 
104. Note also that the Israeli scheme covers property losses as well, but the benefits are 
provided directly by the government. See Sommer, supra note 36, at 353-58 (discussing 
Israel's Property Tax and Compensation Fund Law of 1961). Thus, the Israeli model is not a 
reinsurance model. 
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Government intervened. Their solution was to form Pool Reinsurance 
Ltd. ("Pool Re"), a mutual-reinsurance company set up by the 
Association of British Insurers and the British government that 
consists of approximately 115  insurance companies and 120 Lloyd's 
syndicates.105 Under this regime, which is still in effect today, Pool Re 
provides insurance coverage above the first £100,000 of damage, which 
is expected to be covered by companies applying to Pool Re for 
reinsurance. Companies that wish to purchase Pool Re coverage must 
do so for all of their properties, thus avoiding any potential adverse 
selection. Funds for Pool Re are collected not only from policy 
premiums, but also from a 3 %  levy on all household and motor vehicle 
policies written in Great Britain. If Pool Re has to pay out claims that 
exceed its collected premiums, there is a "call" on all members to pay 
an additional premium equaling 10% of the funds in the pool. Any 
amount above this is paid by the British government.106 
The new U.S. terror-reinsurance system is somewhat different 
from its British forbearer. Under the new program, adopted in 2002, 
the federal government will cover losses arising out of "an act of 
terrorism" as certified by the Secretaries of Treasury and State and the 
Attorney General,107 subject to the following limitations. The program, 
set to last for a three-year trial period, will cover only 90% of 
property-casualty insurers' terrorism-related losses exceeding $10 
billion (with the floor rising to $15 billion over the three-year 
period).108 During this period, there will be a cap on the government's 
terrorism-reinsurance liability of $100 billion.109 Under this program, 
insurance companies would be expected to pay off "smaller" claims up 
to specified fractions of their collected premiums. Specifically, private 
insurers will pay an initial deductible equal to a percentage of their 
earned premiums.11° For losses above this deductible, the government 
would again cover 90% of the losses, with the insurance companies -
and their policyholders - bearing the 10% co-payment.111 The funding 
105. Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, c. 18, § 2(a) (Eng.). 
106. See William B. Bice, Comment, British Government Reinsurance and Acts of 
Terrorism: The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 441, 441 (1994) ("The British 
government has agreed to become the 'reinsurer of last resort' for losses caused by terrorism 
on the British mainland."). 
107. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 102(1)(A). 
108. Id. § 103(e). 
109. Id. § 103(e)(2). 
110. 1 % for 2002, 7% for 2003, 10% for 2004, and 15% for 2005. Id. § 102(7). 
111 .  Id. § 103( e ). If, for a particular terrorist attack, the sum of the deductibles and 
copayments made by private insurers is less than $10 billion, then the federal government 
will essentially tax the insurers the difference. As a result, the insurance industry must bear 
the first $10 billion of terror-related risk. That is what is meant by the term "Insurance 
Marketplace Aggregate Retention Amount" in § 103(e) of the Act. This retention amount 
rises to $15 billion over three years. Between this (rising) floor and the $100 billion ceiling, 
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for the program is expected to come from premiums or surcharges 
imposed (and determined) by the Secretary of Treasury on property­
casualty insurers. 
The program also requires all property-casualty insurers doing 
business in the United States to "make available" in their policies 
terrorism coverage on roughly the same terms, amounts, and coverage 
limitations as are applied to their non-terrorism coverage, although 
the price of that coverage remains an open question.112 At the same 
time, however, individual insurance purchasers can decline to 
purchase the terrorism coverage if they so choose. The Act contains 
no provision making the purchase of terrorism insurance mandatory, 
and there is no set premium that must be charged for such coverage. 
Thus, once an insurer has "made available" terrorism coverage at 
some price, then the purchaser may decline. Insurance is thus available 
in the sense that its offer is mandated, but the purchase of the 
coverage is not required.113 
As was suggested in the previous Part, a good case can be made for 
the proposition that this legislation was unnecessary (and certainly so 
in the long run, as new capital enters the terrorism-insurance market), 
except, perhaps, as a further construction subsidy for lower 
Manhattan.114 Advocates of free markets, for example, will complain 
that government insurance generally tends to be inefficient.115 And 
although last-resort reinsurance coverage leaves more space for the 
private marketplace, it nevertheless intervenes where free market 
proponents think intervention imprudent. Thus, although the British 
approach of last-resort reinsurance may be superior to the Israeli 
approach of occupying the entire market, either approach would be 
the federal government (and federal taxpayers) will act as terrorism reinsurers of last resort. 
Above the $100 billion cap, presumably the risks fall again to the private-reinsurance 
market, although the possibility of ex post government relief cannot be eliminated. For an 
explanation of the Act, see the Insurance Information Institute summary at 
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/septll/ (last visited May 20, 2004). 
1 12. Specifically, the Act provides that each insurer "shall make available, in all of its 
property and casualty insurance policies, coverage for insured losses; and . . .  shall make 
available property and casualty insurance coverage for insured losses that does not differ 
materially from the terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations applicable to losses 
arising from events other than acts of terrorism." Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 
2, § 103(c)(l)(A)-(B). The price will be a function of (a) the actuarial market price for that 
portion of the coverage that will not be federally reinsured (though it might be privately 
reinsured) and (b) the prices that the Secretary of the Treasury ultimately decides to charge 
for the federal reinsurance. 
113. All terrorism exclusions in property-casualty policies in effect on the date of the 
Act were expressly nullified, but, according to the Act, could be reinstated if the insurer 
receives a written statement from the insured authorizing reinstatement, or if the insured 
fails to pay the increased premiums. Id. § 105. 
1 14. Again, a narrowly tailored construction subsidy might have limited the application 
of the Act to insurance in New York State, but such an outcome seems politically unlikely. 
115. Gron & Sykes, supra note 90, at 51. 
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unwelcome from the perspective of those opposed to government 
intervention. In contrast, advocates of a government-centered scheme 
begin with the idea that it is the government's role to protect citizens 
against external attacks and to ease the burdens such attacks create, 
and they then move quickly to the view that the British approach does 
not go far enough because war and terrorism ought to be entirely the 
responsibility of the government. 
There are other reasons to criticize a reinsurer-of-last-resort type 
of subsidy, even if one takes some market-based intervention as a 
given. First, for the regime to have its desired effect (of encouraging 
the purchase of commercially provided terrorism coverage), it must 
involve a substantial subsidy. Thus, it is not enough simply to require 
insurers to make coverage "available." If the end price insurers charge 
is not meaningfully reduced via subsidy from what those prices were 
pre-9/11 ,  terrorism risks will remain "uninsurable," or at least as 
uninsurable as they were before the new law. Hence, the subsidy must 
be real. But the Act, as we have seen, leaves open the amount and 
nature of the subsidy; the Treasury Secretary's discretion is a critical 
feature of the scheme.116 
A second internal criticism of the legislation focuses on the fact 
that it does not actually require the purchase of terrorism insurance. 
The law's noncompulsory character leaves open the possibility that 
insureds may opt not to buy coverage - or to buy relatively little 
coverage - in the hope of receiving ex post government relief upon 
the occurrence of another terrorism disaster. The pattern might follow 
that of flood insurance, where we have an optional scheme, sporting 
semi-mandatory and subsidized insurance, with large numbers of 
nonsubscribers who appeal for relief in the event of a disaster. At least 
the flood-insurance program allows only one bite at the ex post relief 
apple.117 We might have expected a similar rule to be applied here; 
however, it is difficult to imagine that anyone harmed by a future 
terrorist attack will be denied ex post relief for failing to purchase 
what may still be very expensive (albeit "available") terrorism 
insurance. If the goal is to minimize ex post relief, then perhaps the 
better approach would have been routinized (though modest) benefits 
provided directly by the government, comparable to the Israeli 
property-loss compensation regime. 
That the new Act requires insurers to make terrorism coverage 
available but not compulsory may also contribute to a particular sort 
116. Even after the enactment of the federal terrorism-insurance regime, there is some 
evidence that, in the areas considered to be the most likely targets for terrorist attacks, rates 
for terrorism risk have yet to come down. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, D. C. Disputes Insurance 
Study Raising Rates for Terrorism, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2003, at Al (reporting the District of 
Columbia Insurance Commissioner as saying that D.C. will reject the large rate increases for 
terrorism insurance in D.C. recommended by insurance industry ratemaking bureau). 
1 17. See supra note 82. 
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of political economy, or extemality, problem. The general power to 
regulate insurance rates lies with state insurance commissioners; there 
is no general federal regulation of insurance rates. The Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act leaves this unchanged, even for terrorism risks, except 
that the Treasury Secretary is empowered to set the reinsurance 
premiums that property-casualty insurers must pay if they wish to 
receive federal terrorism reinsurance. Thus, if insurers seek large 
increases for terrorism rates in such high-terror-risk jurisdictions as the 
District of Columbia and New York, the insurance regulators can 
refuse to authorize the increases and, because of the new law, the 
insurers will still have to offer terrorism coverage in that jurisdiction or 
withdraw from the market entirely.U8 To the extent insurers decide to 
remain in these markets (perhaps because of a desire to maintain a 
presence in the area and to profit from other lines of insurance that 
are not as affected by terror risks), they would in effect be forced to 
offer below-cost property insurance. Thus, in a small jurisdiction such 
as D.C., insurance purchasers - that is, property owners - would 
receive a significant cross-subsidy from policyholders and property 
owners in the rest of the country. In larger markets (defined by single 
regulatory schemes), such as New York or California, there would be 
intrastate cross-subsidization as well. 
In this manner, a sufficiently generous subsidy may induce some 
insureds who otherwise would not have purchased terrorism insurance 
to do so, while others may still (despite the subsidy) decide to do 
without such coverage (and to allow insurers to insert exclusions) 
because of their expectation that federal relief would be forthcoming 
in the event of a disaster.119 This, in tum, might lead to more uninsured 
property owners, which would inevitably create public pressure to 
provide ex post relief as the victims in those gaps become apparent 
following a disaster. It is thus easy to see an argument as to why 
Congress should have taken the further step of actually requiring 
insurance policies to include terrorism coverage, or forbidding them to 
include terrorism exclusions. Such an outcome, however, was not to be 
expected. Compulsory insurance, though not uncommon at the state 
level (for example, consider auto liability coverage) is quite rare at the 
federal level. Even the National Flood Insurance Program, with 
respect to which there is a fairly strong argument to be made in favor 
118. According to news reports, the D.C. Insurance Commissioner seems to be taking 
precisely this approach. See Hsu, supra note 116. 
119. Given that federal relief for disaster-related property losses is generally quite 
meager (involving mostly loans, with small outright grants in some cases), opting out of 
private insurance in anticipation of government relief may seem irrational. Nonetheless, the 
combination of the high price of private disaster insurance and persistent this-will-never­
happen-to-me optimism among property-insurance purchasers, decisions to opt out of 
disaster-insurance coverage are quite common. 
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of a compulsory insurance regime, is only semi-compulsory,120 and 
many people who should purchase the coverage still do not.121 
Moreover, to make the purchase of terrorism coverage compulsory for 
all property owners under federal law would have required the 
enactment of explicit subsidies to fund the purchase of terrorism 
coverage in the highest risk areas. In contrast, as we have seen, the 
approach chosen by the Act produces more hidden, but perhaps no 
less substantial, cross-subsidies. Finally, note that federally mandated 
coverage may also thrust federal regulators into the role of setting 
primary-level insurance premiums (given that the premiums set by the 
market might be deemed excessive and therefore federal regulation 
necessary); this role of regulating insurance premiums has traditionally 
been left to insurers and to state regulators. 
C. How Will the Federal-Reinsurance Program for Property-Casualty 
Losses Affect Future Relief! 
It bears restating that the new federal legislation deals primarily 
with property losses and not (or at least not directly) with personal 
injury and death. More precisely, the program pays benefits only for 
qualifying terrorism-related losses that are covered by property­
casualty insurers.122 Property-casualty insurance includes property 
insurance and various forms of casualty (or liability) insurance, 
including workers' compensation coverage. It does not, however, 
include life insurance or health insurance.123 Thus, while the federal 
terror-insurance program can be seen as a subsidy for property and 
casualty insurance, it provides no direct subsidy with respect to losses 
120. The purchase of flood insurance since 1994 has been made mandatory in only a 
limited sense. Federally subsidized mortgages are available only to those with flood 
insurance. Moreover, all private mortgage lenders are now "required" to insist on a showing 
of flood insurance not only at the time a mortgage loan is issued, but also during the 
continuing life of the loan. Finally, for those property owners seeking relief aid (SBA loans 
or FEMA grants) following a flood who have not purchased flood insurance, the relief aid is 
made contingent on the purchase and future maintenance of flood insurance; those who fail 
to buy flood insurance at that point are to be denied flood relief aid. See generally Pasterick, 
supra note 81, at 153; FEMA FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 82. On the other 
hand, there are no federal fines imposed on homeowners who fail to purchase flood 
insurance as might exist under a serious (though unlikely) compulsory insurance regime. 
121. Before the changes to the NFIP in 1994, there were studies indicating that less than 
twenty percent of individuals living in floodplain areas and who were supposed to have flood 
insurance, actually purchased such insurance. FEMA FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES, 
supra note 82, at 2. One would expect compliance to have increased since the 1994 
amendments to the program that introduced, for example, the requirement that lenders 
insist on flood coverage throughout the life of mortgage loans. And it may have. It is 
generally believed, however, that there is still significant underinsurance for flood risks. 
122. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 102(5) (qualifying "insured losses" 
defined as losses resulting from terrorist act that is covered by property-casualty insurance). 
123. Id. § 102(12). 
November 2003] Terrorism and Crime 307 
of life or limb caused by terrorist attacks. Therefore, even if we think 
of the program as a sort of permanent (routinized) regime for dealing 
with property losses, it is unlikely to have a large direct effect on the 
probability of future 9/11-Fund-type relief for loss of life. The real 
question is whether the existence of the subsidy will affect the 
likelihood of future disaster declarations and FEMA-type relief for 
property losses. 
As discussed above,124 there is a complex, and somewhat 
counterintuitive, relationship among permanent compensation 
regimes, private-insurance purchases, private charity, and, ultimately, 
ex post government relief. Indeed, that is one of the major themes of 
this Article. Thus, as an initial matter, if we assume that the subsidies 
paid out ex post under the new program to property-casualty insurers 
are substantial, there are reasons to expect that some property owners 
who otherwise would not purchase coverage will at the margin be 
induced to do so. This is so because some of the subsidy to property­
casualty insurers may be passed along to consumers through reduced 
premiums. And if the program works this way, inducing an increase 
(or expected increase) in the purchase of private terrorism insurance, 
we should expect less in the way of ex post relief. Given the additional 
insurance, and thus the drop in uninsured losses, there will be less of a 
sympathy factor, and perhaps less political pressure, to make a disaster 
declaration. And even if a disaster is declared, less relief would be 
forthcoming because of the uninsured loss limitations discussed above. 
Finally, because the federal program will induce more ex ante 
insurance purchases, it may inhibit charitable giving - on the theory 
that donors' giving decisions in disaster cases are also affected by the 
presence of uninsured losses.125 
Although the driving force behind the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act was the (perceived) crisis in property-insurance markets, the 
program is not limited to property losses. Technically, the program 
covers any type of terrorism-related losses that are of the sort covered 
by property-casualty insurers. Again, this does not include life or 
health insurers, but it may include liability insurers. Although the Act 
does not mention liability insurance specifically, the term "casualty" 
insurance generally means liability insurance.126 Moreover, the Act 
124. See supra Part III. 
125. The argument in the text suggests one way in which the federal terrorism-insurance 
program might affect the likelihood of future 9/11-Fund-type relief. The argument involves 
the link, which we identified in Part III.B above, concerning relief for lost property and relief 
for lost life. If we are right that large-scale government relief for property losses is politically 
unlikely unless there is simultaneously a large-scale effort to compensate families of the 
deceased, then a program that will ultimately produce less ex post episodic property relief -
such as this one - may also reduce the political pressure to enact a generous compensation 
regime for lost life. 
126. JERRY, supra note 77, at 47. 
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does specifically incorporate workers' compensation insurance, which 
is a type of liability insurance.127 Thus Congress at least had in mind 
that in the event of another large-scale attack federal dollars could be 
spent to pay workers' compensation claims. Such a possibility, if it 
becomes widely known, could have some of the same effects on 
charitable giving and ex post relief discussed above. The interesting 
question, though, is whether, in the event of another attack sufficiently 
large to trigger the new federal program, payments from the program 
would also be used to pay tort awards and settlements arising out of 
the attacks. On a straightforward reading of the Act, the answer would 
seem to be yes, although Congress and the courts may construe it 
otherwise, or the Treasury Secretary may issue regulations altering 
that result. Still, if tort liability is expected to be covered, then there 
would be reduced political pressure to provide ex post relief (of the 
FEMA sort) or, more likely, increased political and financial pressure 
for Congress to eliminate or at least impose limits on tort liability for 
losses linked to the event. 
D. Other Subsidy Alternatives 
Even if one were to accept the propriety of government 
intervention in the terrorism-insurance market, the superiority of the 
particular type of subsidy embodied in the federal-reinsurance regime 
is by no means self-evident. Instead of routinized relief, it might have 
been better to use some sort of permanent regime of ex post 
subsidization for charitable contributions in the event of disasters of a 
certain magnitude. For example, the government could legislate that 
when emergencies are designated as "national disasters," charitable 
contributions to designated relief agencies would qualify for 
something much more attractive than mere tax deductions; donors 
might, for example, be encouraged with 90% tax credits. Private 
insurance would be discouraged only as much as it is presently, which 
is to say that insurance might go unsold to the extent that people 
expected relief - or (tax) supercharged charitable relief. 
There are at least two reasons to prefer a supercharged subsidy for 
charitable gifts over direct government relief. First, there is the benefit 
of decentralized private monitoring of the efficiency with which the 
money is distributed. The idea here is that charitable organizations 
may be more responsive to efficiency concerns and donor preferences 
than is the federal government, because charities must continue to 
earn the support of their donors. Uncoordinated private donations, 
127. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 103(5). Indeed, the program's 
application to workers' compensation losses is broader than with respect to other types of 
losses. That is, the program does not apply to losses arising out of "war," unless they are 
workers' compensation losses. Id. § 102(1)(B)(i). 
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however, as opposed to centrally coordinated government relief, may 
lead to the over- or under-compensation of some losses, so that 
government relief may remain superior to better-monitored private 
relief. 
The second potential benefit of the supercharged charitable-giving 
approach requires some implicit assumptions about relief and 
redistribution, including the idea that such an approach may actually 
lead to more dollars of relief per tax-dollars spent than does direct 
relief funded through tax increases. There is some evidence that, at 
least with respect to high-bracket taxpayers, the price elasticity for 
charitable contributions is greater than one: that is, for every dollar of 
tax revenue foregone because of the deduction, more than a dollar of 
charitable transfer is made to the relevant charity.128 That this effect 
seems to be concentrated in high-bracket taxpayers is unsurprising 
(given the relationship between the value of a deduction and the 
taxpayer's marginal rate bracket) and suggests why a credit - and 
perhaps a supercharged credit - might be desirable in some settings. 
As another alternative, the government might simply subsidize, 
through a demand-side deduction, credit, or direct cash transfer, all 
property insurance that covers terrorism risk. Under such a regime, 
the more significant the risk, the more insurance will be sold - and 
there will be less pressure for relief in the event of large losses. Recent 
legislation and current patterns in the insurance market seem to 
assume that future terrorist strikes will resemble those of 9/11,  aiming 
at large buildings in urban centers - especially those in D.C., New 
York, and San Francisco.129 Yet other horrors are imaginable, and 
while there is no need to spell them out here in gruesome detail, it 
does not take much imagination to see that billions of dollars in 
economic losses could be suffered through terrorist attacks on 
transportation networks and various industries, such that there would 
• again be a clamor for federal relief, and property insurance would play 
a smaller role than business interruption or disability insurance, for 
example. If the war on and with terrorists continues, we should not be 
surprised to see the question of the structure of federal relief revisited. 
And, again, an attempt to move expectations away from episodic 
federal relief seems likely and under the circumstances healthy. 
128. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 274 
(1985) (summarizing studies which consistently found price elasticities greater than one in 
absolute value for all but the lowest income groups; for low-income groups, the studies were 
inconclusive); Charles T. Clotfelter & C. Eugene Steuerle, Charitable Contributions, in How 
TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 436 (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 
1981) (finding highest price elasticities in higher income groups). 
129. See Hsu, supra note 116. 
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E. Does the Expectation of (Episodic or Routine) Relief Internalize 
Costs? 
A different sort of normative question about disaster relief 
(whether such relief comes predictably, episodically, or even 
routinely) concerns the behavioral or cost-internalization function of 
expected relief. Our focus is on government actors, and interest groups 
that influence these actors and their budgets. One might argue that a 
government that expects to pay relief in the event of famines and 
earthquakes might be more inclined to take precautions that would 
limit the losses suffered from such catastrophes. These natural 
disasters bring on losses, to be sure, but these losses can be curtailed 
with good distribution systems, warning mechanisms, building codes, 
and other items within the government's control. The prospect of 
large-scale payouts in the aftermath of major losses might, the 
argument goes, encourage government to take cost-benefit justified 
precautions long before disasters strike. This might happen because 
the government is responsive to such an internalization tool, which is 
how we might think of the budgetary pressure associated with 
expected relief payments. More subtly and convincingly, such 
precautions might be encouraged by various interest groups eager to 
see the government avoid large disasters, because these interest 
groups project that expected relief efforts might one day crowd out the 
government projects they desire.130 
This argument about disaster relief as an indirect means of 
encouraging precautions that are in the government's domain is surely 
a weak one when it comes to post-terrorism relief or subsidized 
insurance. First, the probability of large-scale attacks is low, and as we 
have seen, governments and disparate interest groups could reason 
that most terrorist incidents will not in fact be followed by relief 
packages because the scale of loss will most likely be small. In 
anticipation of the argument in the next Part we might say that most 
terrorism is like most crime in the sense that most incidents impose 
direct losses on very few victims and businesses, so that there is no 
political pressure for aid. A graphic murder (or terror attack) might jar 
a jurisdiction, or at least its eager politicians, into taking new steps to 
reduce crime or fright, but it is less likely to create a movement for 
130. See Levmore, supra note 34, at 18-19. The term "interest group" normally implies a 
relatively small and well-organized politically active unit, and that is how we use the term 
here. Note, however, that the internalization effect of creating an expectation of relief (or a 
permanent regime of compensation) can also be driven not by interest groups per se, but 
also by majoritarian politics. This could occur if the issue of large compensation payouts 
were to become sufficiently salient (or were to be made salient by an issue entrepreneur) 
such that the "average" voter might even demand a response. Thus, the budgetary pressure 
mentioned in the text might be majoritarian pressure that would create the incentive to 
prevent compensated losses from leading to large government deficits. 
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economic relief, which seems to require a massive scale of loss. A 
second reason that the prospect of post-terror relief is unlikely to play 
an important role in encouraging pre-terror precautions is that such 
precautions are already encouraged by political self-interest and, no 
doubt, by a deeply held commitment to the safety of the country. It is 
hard to imagine that politicians need much extra incentive to combat 
and deter terrorism. Few things attract as much media and public 
attention; the political repercussions from a successful but preventable 
or foreseeable terrorist attack are enormous, and even politicians 
appear able to rise to the occasions offered by war and terrorism such 
that they do what they genuinely believe to be in the best interest of 
the country, or perhaps in the interest of an attractive historical 
record, rather than in their narrow self-interest, though it may simply 
be the case that the two converge. 
Thinking about post-terror relief (or pre-terror insurance and 
subsidized insurance) in such functional terms may inform the division 
of labor between governments and private property owners. Thus, it is 
plausible that routinized relief, perhaps along the lines of the British 
model or the new U.S. terror-insurance program, can send signals to 
property owners as to what their losses might be, and that property 
owners will in tum secure buildings more carefully or take other steps 
that are more in their control than in the government's. Although 
somewhat plausible, this possibility does seem unlikely. The 
government can mandate private security precautions, and even 
the strongest proponents of privatization typically see the government 
as having a comparative advantage in this regard. It is worth 
remembering, for example, that Israel's El Al Airline, which is 
the only carrier known for taking extra (and, since the 1970s, 
highly effective) precautions against terrorist attacks, has been 
government owned. 
F. Summary 
We are skeptical of the recent efforts by the federal government to 
intervene in the terrorism-insurance market for property coverage. We 
agree with other market-oriented commentators that if left alone the 
market would likely have been able to provide the necessary coverage, 
along with some useful signals as to the largest outstanding risks and 
some valuable, if individually painful, cost-internalization incentives to 
individual decision-makers. It may be that in the absence of such 
intervention developers would have shied away from constructing very 
tall skyscrapers, but that result is not patently unreasonable. In fact, it 
is hard to imagine that the government has a positive-extemality 
reason to encourage the very buildings that might impose the most 
attractive targets. One could imagine a political movement to rebuild 
the World Trade Center exactly as it was, structural improvements 
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aside. This sort of symbolic or political reaction, amounting to a 
statement aimed at domestic and foreign audiences or as a 
reaffirmation of the spirit of community, might indeed have required 
some government subsidy or at least a promise of insurance coverage. 
But by and large the private market is likely to perform well over the 
long run. 
To the extent that some sort of government intervention was called 
for - whether as a construction subsidy or as a potentially desirable 
redistributive transfer from the rest of the country to the business 
centers of our major cities - it remains unclear whether the particular 
type of subsidy chosen by Congress reflects the most effective 
approach. Certainly, it should not be expected that the enactment of 
this program will eliminate the possibility of future ex post relief 
payments in the event of another catastrophe on the order of 9/11. So 
long as insurance is not compulsory, there will be some 
underinsurance and - as we have argued throughout this Article -
pressure to provide relief in the event of large disaster losses, 
especially in the case of terrorism losses. A serious change in the war 
on terrorism must take place before a routinized permanent regime of 
terrorism-loss compensation is established. Nonetheless, even this sort 
of regime will not do much in the way of creating improved incentives 
for government decisionmakers, for existing political checks already 
provide effective incentives in this regard. 
In sum, the case for public and subsidized insurance covering 
terrorism risks is surprisingly weak. In contrast - and as we are about 
to explore - the case for public insurance with respect to the harms of 
everyday crime is relatively and remarkably strong. The comparison 
can be put in terms of a positive puzzle: given the mix of private and 
public compensation that we have described for disaster losses 
(terrorism losses in particular), why do we not see a similar mix of 
private and public compensation for losses of property and life caused 
by crimes more generally? First-party insurance is generally available 
for property and lives, but many crime-caused losses are uninsured; 
yet there is generally no government relief or government liability 
following crimes - even for crimes that the government might easily 
have prevented. 
The absence of government payments or "relief" - an expression 
that we now expand to include government liability for the failure to 
prevent losses - in the crime setting, taken together with the presence 
of government relief in the terrorism setting, is especially interesting, 
because a policy or expectation that the government will provide relief 
for crime losses seems somewhat likely to provide a useful cost­
internalization or incentive effect for government actors. 
Governments do not seem to need much of a push to battle terrorists, 
but government's inclination to prevent crime, and especially crime 
that affects poorer citizens, appears to be less impressively encouraged 
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by politics as  usual. The idea is  that governments at every level have a 
strong political reason to take precautions against terrorism, if only 
because there is no issue that is as salient to the electorate and as 
central to the self-conception of our political leaders. In contrast, some 
politicians seem to thrive (or at least to win reelection) despite rather 
poor crime-fighting records. We might say that governments appear 
naturally to internalize the costs of terrorism more than they do the 
costs associated with crime. This is the argument that we explore in the 
next Part. 
V. INSURING AGAINST CRIME 
One conclusion that emerges from careful thinking about insuring 
against terrorism is that there may be more to be gained from a 
program of government-sponsored crime insurance, or a promise of 
government relief for crime losses, than first meets the eye. The idea 
of government crime insurance gives rise to both normative and 
positive observations. As a normative matter, the argument for 
subsidized crime insurance, or simply the promise of ex post relief 
from crime, is stronger than the argument for government 
involvement with terrorism risks. As a positive matter, the current 
absence of a strong federal crime-insurance or crime-relief program is 
likely attributable to failures of the political process - in the sense 
that the parties most likely to benefit from such a regime are least 
likely to overcome collective-action problems to lobby for its 
enactment.131 It is worth emphasizing that neither form of relief -
131. Two efforts at the federal level to provide government-subsidized insurance for 
crime, and government subsidies for general property coverage in high-crime areas, 
respectively, were the Federal Crime Insurance Program ("FCIP"), which was created in 
1971, and the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 ("UPPRA"). 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb to 1749bbb-21 (2003) .  Both were adopted in response to the urban riots 
of the 1960s and a concern that widespread withdrawal of insurance coverage within urban 
areas might ultimately contribute to decay in urban neighborhoods. See, e.g. , ALICE R. 
ZIMMERMAN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCH. OF PUB. AFF. SPECIAL REP., WHAT IS FAIR? AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 'FAIR ACCESS TO INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS' 
PLAN ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF URBAN PROPERTY INSURANCE 29 
(2000) (noting that the main stated purpose of the federal UPPRA was to "bring stability 
back to the urban insurance market and reverse the cycle of decline in urban areas"); David 
I. Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. 
PROBS. 1, 6 (1980) (asserting that the riots created· widespread refusals to insure in urban 
areas). Under the FCIP, which was administered by FEMA through its Federal Insurance 
Administration, the federal government provided small amounts of robbery and/or burglary 
insurance ($10,000 for individuals and $15,000 for businesses) to tenants in high-crime areas. 
Adrienne C. Locke, Several Criteria Restrict Crime Cover Eligibility, Bus. INS., Sept. 25, 
1989, at 35. Premiums were collected to fund the claims, although there was some element of 
government subsidy as well. Premiums were based on a rough degree of risk assessment and 
on a showing of lack of affordable private insurance for the risk. Id. Thus, the FCIP was a 
form of direct government insurance for inner-city crime losses. The UPPRA, in contrast, 
was different; it was a program, not wholly unlike the Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Act, 
under which the federal government agreed to provide subsidized riot reinsurance to private 
insurers who participated in what are called Fair Access to Insurance ("FAIR") programs 
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whether for crime or for terror - may be wise, unless the goal is to 
express sympathy or engage in opportunistic wealth redistribution. 
And it is also possible that both amount to sensible policies. The 
argument here is simply that the case for crime relief is probably 
sounder than that for terror relief. Terror can be seen as a subset of 
crime, so that the argument can also be seen as one which takes the 
continuing experience with the 9/11 Fund's post-terror relief as an 
opportunity to think about crime relief more generally. The arguments 
are simple and build in a straightforward fashion on the discussion up 
to this point. 
The best case for government-subsidized or government-provided 
crime insurance (that is, for crime-caused losses of both life and 
property) is one that combines a dose of awareness about potential 
underinsurance problems with internalization and critical mass 
considerations. The argument gains force if we think that 
redistribution in favor of less affluent citizens is a good thing. We try 
to set aside this consideration, however, if only because even those 
who favor wealth redistribution through law might see that it is 
generally more efficient to accomplish this goal through unconstrained 
lump sum transfers rather than through ongoing regulatory or welfare 
systems.132 Notwithstanding these considerations, there are, as we will 
see, surprisingly sound arguments for government-sponsored crime 
insurance or some comparable compensation or liability regime.133 
run by the states, under which all insurers operating in the states must participate in 
providing insurance to the residual, or riskiest, market. Ultimately, both the FCIP and 
UPPRA were eliminated. The former was abolished in 1996, see Office of Inspector General, 
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, FIA's Federal Crime Insurance Program, at 
http://www .fema.gov/ig/h-09-95.shtm (last updated on Feb. 11 ,  2003), and the latter was 
terminated in 1983, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1749bbb(b), although a number of states continue to 
operate FAIR plans. We are aware of no definitive study on what caused the failures of 
these federal efforts. There is some evidence, however, that one of the problems was lack of 
adequate marketing. Carla Rivera, Few In Riot Area Used Federal Crime Insurance, L.A. 
TIMES, July 14, 1992, at Al (asserting that evidence in California suggests "that residents of 
riot-scarred communities who might have benefited from the insurance did not know of its 
availability"). Another perceived problem was the feeling that the program was essentially a 
subsidy for New York City, where roughly half of the nationwide FCIP policies were written 
by 1992. Kevin McKenzie, Insurance; Government-Backed Protection from Crime Cancelled 
in Tennessee, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 23, 1992, at Cl. In part due to this 
perceived unfairness, many states began to opt out of the program throughout the 1980s. 
Consumer Credit and Insurance Propeny, Insurance in Low Income Areas: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban 
Affairs, 103rd Cong. (1994) WL14187690 (statement of Elaine A. McReynolds, Member, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency). With respect to this last problem, one obvious 
solution would be to make the program compulsory, so that opt-outs of this sort would 
not occur. 
132. For a reconsideration of this question, see Kyle D. Logue & Ronen Avraham, 
Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 
(2003). 
133. The idea of government-sponsored crime insurance has received scant attention in 
the academic literature on crime, and no jurisdiction of which we are aware - in the United 
States or elsewhere - has adopted the sort of crime-compensation regime that we describe 
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But then there are counterarguments as well. The most significant 
of these builds on the concern that a subsidized crime insurance or 
crime relief program would create enormous incentives to commit or 
tolerate crime. This is nothing more than an instance of the obvious 
moral hazard problem according to which payments for death or 
injury will result in more deaths and more injuries. Another, perhaps 
less dramatic, concern is that a legal system that provided government­
sponsored crime insurance but not government-sponsored terrorism 
insurance would generate what we might call sorting costs, because of 
the need to decide whether given crimes were or were not committed 
by terrorists. These concerns are real but not insurmountable. Before 
turning to these problems, however, it is useful to consider the 
character of the existing market for crime insurance. 
A. The Crime-Insurance Market 
Losses from crime include life and property, and we consider both 
here, if only to parallel our discussion of terrorism coverage. We are 
not claiming, as some have done in the terrorism context, that there 
should be general government involvement in compensating crime 
losses due to an uninsurability problem. To the contrary, crime-related 
losses to both life and property can be, and often are, covered under 
standard insurance policies. In the typical life-insurance case, where 
family members are the beneficiaries of a policy that is written on the 
life of the primary earner in the family, the death benefit will be paid 
out whether the insured dies of natural causes or is murdered.134 Life­
insurance policies generally do not contain murder or foul-play 
exclusions. Special murder policies - policies that pay out only for 
murder - are not generally used (and likely would be considered void 
as against public policy), both because it is thought that standard life­
insurance policies do the job well enough and because explicit murder 
policies might be considered too much of an invitation to moral 
hazard. 
Many property-insurance policies are equally broad. Standard 
property policies tend to cover crime-related property losses, which 
means that such policies do not generally contain crime exclusions, 
and defend in this Part. Some countries do have government-provided "crime­
compensation" programs, but those regimes offer minimal benefits above what those 
countries' relatively generous social insurance programs already provide. See, e.g. , 
COMPENSATING CRIME VICTIMS: A EUROPEAN SURVEY (Desmond Greer ed., 1996) 
(summarizing crime-compensation regimes in European countries). Some U.S. states also 
have minimal crime-compensation regimes. See, e.g. , The Office of Mass. Attorney Gen., 
Victim Compensation and Assistance, at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/victim_svc/index.asp? 
headl=Victim+Services&section=8 (last visited Apr. 17, 2003). 
134. This assumes, of course, that the beneficiary is not the murderer, which would 
amount to a very egregious form of insurance fraud - as well as murder. 
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although there are exceptions.135 In addition there are special crime­
loss policies; for example, insurance companies offer business policies 
covering robbery and employee theft. These policies may fill in gaps 
(perhaps left by the occasional crime-related exclusion) in standard 
property policies, or they may provide additional or overlapping 
coverage. 
B. The (Modest) Case for Government-Sponsored Crime Insurance 
1 .  The Underinsurance Argument 
Given that there exists a market for insurance against many of the 
risks associated with crime, why would we need government 
involvement? The arguments contain elements of paternalism and 
market failure, and to some extent repeat those referred to in our 
earlier discussion of terrorism. One argument in favor of government­
sponsored crime insurance is that additional coverage is desirable 
because individuals tend to purchase inadequate coverage for a variety 
of contingencies. This problem of myopia or a disinclination to dwell 
on unpleasant eventualities would seem to apply most clearly to life­
insurance purchases,136 but it is plausible for property insurance as 
well,137 and it is an argument that extends rather easily to planning and 
insuring against crime. 
Taken alone, however, the concern with underinvestment in 
insurance would probably not be enough to justify government 
intervention in crime-insurance markets, given the moral hazard 
concerns discussed below and given that there may be better ways of 
dealing with a general problem of underinvestment in property and 
life insurance - if such a problem does indeed exist.138 There are, 
however, reasons to suspect that the underinsurance problem is 
especially significant with respect to crime losses and, thus, that a 
crime-compensation regime or crime-insurance subsidy might be more 
justified than a similar regime for, say, disaster losses. 
135. Some property policies contain exclusions for thefts under certain conditions. For 
example, in an obvious effort to minimize moral hazard, some property policies limit theft 
coverage to situations in which there is visible evidence of forced entry. See, e.g. , Atwater 
Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'! Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985) (interpreting "forcible 
entry" clause in burglary policy). 
136. See Logue, supra note 18, at 28 (analogizing problem of underinvestment in life 
insurance to well-known problem of underinvestment in retirement savings). 
137. A mitigating factor in property-insurance markets, however, is the involvement of 
commercial lenders, who tend to insist on a certain amount of property coverage before 
approving mortgage loans, and, who one would expect, because of repeat play and 
competitive pressures, to suffer less from myopia and other cognitive biases. 
138. If underinsurance is a general problem, then a broader solution would seem to be 
called for than one which focuses on crime-related risks alone. 
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Many victims of crime are underinsured. Inner-city property 
owners, including businesses and homeowners, self-insure far more 
than their counterparts in affluent areas, in part because of availability 
problems. 139 In addition, inner-city property owners and the businesses 
they deal with may expect crime to lead to insolvency, so that 
insurance of a sort is accomplished through higher interest rates and 
less credit with respect to goods and services. As far as life insurance is 
concerned, it simply is not possible for low-income earners to purchase 
significant insurance coverage, even though the value of their lives to 
their families can be substantial in economic terms. Thus, with respect 
to life insurance and in some cases homeowners' insurance, the 
underinsurance problem, especially in inner cities, has a distributional 
component. 
In contrast, although there is no doubt that many of the victims of 
the 9/11 tragedy were underinsured, there is no reason to think that 
the bulk of them were as underinsured as most crime victims are, given 
their relative wealth. More interesting, when we turn to our third front 
(namely, natural disasters), those who receive flood and earthquake 
relief can be thought of as underinsured due to anticipation of 
government relief. Underinsurance may even be considered a strategy 
for seeking relief, and perhaps therefore not an especially powerful 
normative justification for such relief. Victims of crime, by contrast, 
have no reason to expect relief because their losses are episodic and 
not normally of the sort that trigger large-scale relief or charitable 
efforts. The idea of payments to these underinsured persons thus 
seems more palatable than comparable payments to victims of floods 
and earthquakes. One can think of such payments as redistributive, to 
be sure, but one can also think of them as aiming to encourage 
economic activity and a residential presence in inner cities and other 
places where crime is prevalent and where a population revival would 
probably lead to less crime and to greater economic growth. We turn 
to this justification more fully in the next Part.140 
139. See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN, supra note 131; Robert Klein, Availability and Affordability 
Problems in Urban Homeowners Insurance Markets, in INSURANCE REDLINING: 
DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
43 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1997); Gregory D. Squires et al., Insurance Redlining, Agency 
Location, and the Process of Urban Disinvestment, 26 URB. AFF. Q. 567 (1991). 
140. We need not resort to an argument that there is underinsurance for noneconomic 
losses; the family of a victim may not be made whole by receiving money in return for life, 
but an important part of the plan, as discussed more fully below, is to give the government 
a budgetary incentive to fight crime, so that payments for noneconomic losses make 
excellent sense. 
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2. The Internalization Argument 
Internalization arguments build on the idea that a party will take 
the implications of what it does more seriously if it is made to pay for 
the consequences of its actions. When firms or governments are made 
to pay, however, there is reason to doubt the internalization logic, 
because there are agency problems and other barriers between the 
expected payments and the employees on the front line who act in the 
name of the firm or government. Yet there is no doubt that monetary 
burdens will eventually have an impact on governmental (and other 
enterprises') actions. If courts raise the compensation level required of 
governments that take private property for public use, we can, for 
example, expect these governments to take less property. When we 
say that liability may not be necessary to make the government combat 
terrorism effectively it is not because governments do not care about 
making payments, but rather because it seems likely that the political 
repercussions following an incompetently managed war against 
terrorism are likely to motivate government officials at least as much 
as any monetary incentives. 
In the case of crime fighting, the argument is that the same 
governments that might be dismissed by the electorate in the event of 
failed wars, unchecked epidemics, and other such failures, might 
survive perfectly well even though a minority of the population 
continues to live in fear of crime and suffers greatly from it. In these 
circumstances, economic incentives aimed at the government, or, in a 
subtler version of the argument, at interest groups in positions to 
influence the government, may play an important role. Specifically, a 
government that pays for crime, or for losses suffered where there are 
high crime rates, might do a superior job at fighting crime, or 
budgeting the resources necessary to do so. 
This argument is premised on the assumptions that crime can be 
discouraged and that, while the government is the obvious party, or 
even the only party, to take both the costs and the benefits of crime 
prevention into account, it might not have the incentive to do so if left 
to its own devices. In a simple sense, the argument is that the 
government could be encouraged with economic incentives to do that 
which is largely already in its control. The argument becomes more 
compelling the more we think of the government as politically 
unresponsive to many of crime's victims. This is especially true of the 
vast number of ordinary crime victims - individuals and businesses 
whose cases, because they are so numerous, are not reported in the 
media and do not thereby garner public sympathy. These victims may 
not be brought together as a political unit by a single, galvanizing 
event, as happens with terrorist attacks or disasters more generally, 
and thus may lack the power necessary to attract political attention 
and government action. 
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In sum, to the extent that crime victims, or those who live in fear of 
becoming crime victims, are diffuse and poorly organized, and to the 
extent that a large part of the population need not share the fear that 
these victims bear, crime losses may be undervalued by local and state 
authorities, and are certainly undervalued by federal government 
officials. Crime rates in some areas may then be higher than is 
optimal.141 Given the presence of imperfect political checks and 
market failures, economic incentives become more valuable 
instruments of reform. At the very least, interest groups that make 
claims on the government's resources may take the task of crime 
fighting more seriously if their own projects are threatened by the 
payouts that the government would need to make in a world where 
crime insurance was the government's concern. 
Interest groups would also play an important role if the proposal 
were structured not as government-provided ex post compensation for 
crime losses, but as an ex ante subsidy for privately provided crime 
insurance. This approach, which is more market-based than the direct 
crime-insurance alternative, would enhance crime-cost internalization 
by creating a cohesive and potentially powerful interest group - the 
insurance industry - with an interest in crime prevention. Once a 
number of large property insurers have been induced, via the subsidy, 
to sell policies on buildings located in high-crime areas, those insurers 
will have an enormous financial stake in seeing that property crime is 
reduced in that area. Thus, just as auto insurers compose a powerful 
political force in this country for increased auto-safety standards, so 
too the property and life-insurance industry under this sort of regime 
would have an interest in encouraging lawmakers to adopt effective 
crime-reducing measures.142 
What would an ex ante crime-insurance subsidy look like? It could 
appear on the demand side or the supply side. The subsidy could take 
the form of a tax deduction or credit available to individuals who 
purchase property insurance on buildings located in high-crime areas. 
Alternatively, the subsidy could be on the supply side, perhaps 
administered through some sort of government-provided reinsurance 
for crime-related losses. Such a proposal would be analogous to the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act program, except that the government 
would provide reinsurance for acts of crime rather than for acts of 
terrorism. As with that program, adverse selection problems could 
give rise to the need for a rule compelling insurers to provide crime 
141. This is a theoretical claim about the structure of incentives for crime prevention. 
The claim, if right, applies even though crime rates may have gone down in recent years. The 
point is that, under a crime-compensation regime, crime rates might have decreased even 
further. 
142. We predict that this phenomenon is already taking place with respect to legislation 
designed to reduce auto theft, given that many auto-insurance policies currently cover such 
losses. 
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coverage (or not to exclude such coverage) in their general property 
policies. This would be similar to the prohibition on terrorism 
exclusions in the Act.143 In addition, the crime-insurance program 
might go so far as to compel property owners, or owners in some 
areas, to purchase crime coverage. As mentioned in the previous Part, 
however, there are practical and political limits to enforcing 
compulsory insurance laws.144 
3 .  The Critical Mass Argument (or the First-Mover Problem) 
The critical mass argument applies primarily to property insurance 
and may provide the strongest basis for advocating government 
involvement in crime-insurance markets. The concern is that efficient 
and desirable economic development might be stifled or foregone 
where private actors wait for one another to move forward. In 
particular, a high-crime area might require a first mover, or a promise 
of development, to induce investors to come forward. The collective­
action problem among business owners, real-estate developers, and 
property insurers is that, whereas business investment in high-crime 
areas may ultimately be profitable if enough businesses decide to 
locate there (or decide not to move away), there is relatively little 
incentive for any single business or insurer to take the first step. 
Indeed, the underinsurance problem within urban areas mentioned 
above, especially with respect to property coverage, may be in part 
attributable to this critical mass or first-mover problem.145 Therefore, 
government-subsidized or government-provided insurance in high­
crime areas might serve to signal or guarantee that an investment in 
such an area is better than it seems to private investors who cannot yet 
observe the influx of other, like-minded investors. Moreover, if one is 
persuaded by the internalization argument, the announcement of such 
a government program should credibly signal a renewed commitment 
to crime prevention on the part of the government, and thus lower 
crime-insurance premiums in the long run. 
C. Objections to Government-Sponsored Crime Insurance 
1 .  Sorting Costs 
We argued in Part IV above that the case for government­
sponsored terrorism insurance is rather weak, at least in the current 
state of the world. In this Part we have argued that the case for 
143. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 105. 
144. See supra note 82 (discussing the difficulties that the National Flood Insurance 
Program has had in "compelling" purchase of flood coverage). 
145. See supra Part V.B.1. 
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government-sponsored crime insurance is relatively strong. Thus, we 
might imagine a regime in which crime but not terrorism losses were 
compensated by the government - or by an insurer who in turn 
receives subsidies from the government. Under such a regime, then, 
there would be a need to distinguish general crime losses from 
terrorism losses. An obvious objection to such an approach would be 
to raise the specter of sorting costs and to suggest that we can have 
either relief for terror and crime, or relief for neither, but not for j ust 
one of the two. This objection seeks to avoid the litigation and other 
transaction costs that will be associated with determining whether a 
death or property loss was caused by terrorist activity or by mere 
crime. This need to distinguish terrorism from other crimes arises, of 
course, in a system of relief or subsidized insurance that covers crime 
but excludes terrorism losses, j ust as it does in a scheme that covers 
terrorism but not other crimes. 
It seems fair to assume that this sorting problem is a minor one, 
especially when evaluated on the scale of the potential costs and 
benefits arising from crime insurance. The sorting cost is likely to be 
modest because terrorists, in more cases than not, take credit for their 
deeds, while most criminals seek to draw less attention to their 
identities. The 9/11 attacks are an important and perhaps 
overwhelming counterexample, but it is hardly unreasonable to say 
that terrorists take credit for their deeds far more often than do 
ordinary criminals. 
It could be otherwise; terrorists might for example seek to advance 
their causes by over-claiming, taking credit for crimes, such as arsons 
and deaths, that were not of their doing. In such cases, the information 
received following a loss event would be virtually useless. The over­
claiming phenomenon, which doubtless happens on occasion, would 
obviously work at cross-purposes with those terrorist organizations 
that do in fact commit the terrorist acts and that wish to maintain the 
clarity and control of their messages. An obvious response to this 
over-claiming phenomenon on the part of such terrorists would be for 
the terrorists to identify themselves before an event rather than soon 
after, and this they sometimes do. This sort of signaling technique was 
common, for example, in the case of the Irish Republican Army, 
though it is either uncommon or unheard of in Israel's intifada and in 
other theaters. The media have often regarded advance notice as a 
humanitarian gesture aimed at saving lives, but we now see that it is 
possible that this is a strategy for taking credit where it is due.146 
146. It is also unclear how the prospect of victim compensation or relief affects the 
motives of terrorists, either in the choice of their targets or their decisions to claim credit or 
not. Under a regime of compensation for terrorism but not for other crime, terrorists might 
consider whether their objectives are better achieved by imposing compensated or 
uncompensated losses. But this issue seems quite small when compared with the other sorts 
of calculations that will come into play. 
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Another way of ensuring proper credit (which is to say blame) would 
be for the perpetrators to disclose details of the attack that have not 
been made public and that only the they would know. 
There is no need to dwell on this issue. We are not arguing that 
there will be no sorting costs; our point is that those costs should be 
relatively low and should not be different in kind or magnitude from 
the sorting costs that are associated with any type of insurance regime. 
Private-insurance contracts, for example, generate huge sorting costs, 
as policyholders and insurers spend enormous sums litigating the 
question of whether a particular loss is covered or excluded under the 
policy in question. One strategy from the insurance context for dealing 
with these costs is to use the burden of proof as part of the sorting 
process. In most insurance coverage cases, the burden of proof lies, in 
the first instance, with the policyholder to demonstrate that a claim is 
covered under the policy - that the individual is the named insured, 
that an insured event has occurred, and the like. Once this showing has 
been made, the burden switches to the insurer to prove the existence 
of a particular exclusion that excuses coverage.147 Thus, under a 
terrorism compensation regime, insureds or claimants for relief might 
be given the burden of proving that a loss was caused by terrorists, or, 
under a crime compensation regime, that it was not caused by 
terrorists. It is noteworthy that Israel, which again offers modest relief 
for victims of terror but hardly anything for victims of other crimes, 
has had little difficulty with sorting between the two. In one 
exceptional Israeli case, the murder of an Israeli by a Palestinian who 
had been the victim's lover raised the crime-versus-terror question 
because the claimants argued that animus against Israelis contributed 
to the perpetrator's motivation.148 Cases such as this one seem to be 
remarkable rather than normal; they should not be seen as harbingers 
of incessant litigation. 
A much more serious sorting problem would likely arise in 
distinguishing between crimes and accidents rather than between 
147. Consolidated Edison v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 690 (N.Y. 2002) 
("Generally, it is for the insured to establish coverage and for the insurer to prove that an 
exclusion in the policy applies to defeat coverage."); see generally 9 LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 137:5 (3d ed. 2003) (summarizing the burden of proof in insurance cases). 
148. In Coca v. Approving Auth. , an Israeli District Court held that murder did qualify 
as a "hostile act," thereby invoking the program's relatively generous terror-compensation 
benefits. See Sommer, supra note 36, at 340-42 (citing V.A. (T.A.) 4076/98, Coca v. 
Approving Auth., 32(10) Dinim-Dis. Ct. 485). The Israeli legislature has created a rebuttable 
presumption that " [w]here a person has been injured under circumstances affording 
reasonable grounds for believing that he has sustained an enemy-inflicted injury, the injury 
shall be regarded as enemy-inflicted unless the contrary is proved." Victim of Hostile Acts 
(Pensions) Law, 1970, 24 L.S.I. 131, (1969-70). Such a presumption is unsurprising in a 
country that experiences as many attacks as Israel does, and that wishes to avoid significant 
litigation over close cases. Interestingly, however, there is no such presumption in property­
damage cases, although there too Israeli courts face the terror-crime distinction. Sommer, 
supra note 36, at 355. 
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(mere) crimes and terrorism. Any system of crime insurance or other 
payments must deal with cases where there is arguably criminal 
wrongdoing and also a massive tort. Generally speaking, we assume 
that the higher standard necessary for a criminal conviction will serve 
to police this line. In any event, we might think of the crime-insurance 
plan as beginning with very specific crimes rather than all crimes. 
Murder and armed robbery might be crimes with which to begin. 
There is probably little reason to fear that governments will quickly 
lower these crime rates and allow other uninsured crimes to 
mushroom. Moreover, all these insurance schemes work best when the 
government pays for losses after a certain threshold, so that it is high 
crime rates, rather than all crime, that trigger payments. 
2. The Moral Hazard Problem 
The strongest argument against government-sponsored crime 
insurance will already have occurred to most readers. There is a 
formidable potential for moral hazard associated with compensation 
for crime-related losses. On the life-insurance side, compensation at 
the high levels provided, say, by the 9/11 Fund could certainly cause an 
increase in the murder rate. No life-insurance company would agree to 
a million dollars of term or whole life insurance on every citizen of a 
city at prevailing rates, because the provision of such coverage, even at 
rates that were initially set by the prevailing market, might well lead to 
murders or to negligence on the part of likely beneficiaries. The life­
insurance market would soon spiral out of control. Companies do 
agree to sell life insurance to groups, but the amounts are modest in 
comparison to the known earnings of the members of the group. These 
insureds are then worth more alive than dead to their beneficiaries. It 
would be startling, therefore, to see life insurers offering substantial 
amounts of group life insurance to unemployed persons. Without the 
ability to reduce coverage amounts or to screen applicants or even 
beneficiaries (as is possible with employer-provided group coverage), 
insurance costs would rise, squeezing out good-faith purchasers. Put 
differently, insurance companies cannot easily gather information 
about disaffected relatives or disgruntled business partners, and so 
they will decline to enter into a contract that gives the beneficiary an 
incentive to prefer that the insured be dead rather than alive. The 
moral hazard issue is, if anything, of yet greater concern to the 
government when it is the insurer, because it cares or ought to care 
about the lives of its citizenry more than any for-profit insurer does. 
For-profit life insurers will seek to prevent murders because murder 
prevention increases profits; in contrast, the government as life insurer 
is, or ought to be, concerned about murder rates for intrinsic as well as 
for revenue reasons. The moral hazard problem also extends to 
coverage for property crimes (or insurance); full compensation would 
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surely generate an increase in the number of reported thefts, arsons, 
vandalism episodes, and other purported crimes. 
How might a government-sponsored regime of crime insurance or 
relief respond to these serious concerns? This question can be 
considered in connection with direct government relief for crime­
related losses or with the crime-insurance subsidy alternative. In both 
cases, the private-insurance market can be instructive. 
First, at a minimum, we must imagine that crime relief would 
provide modest benefits, or amounts that could be shown to represent 
no more than true economic losses. Much as a jewelry store owner 
who carries theft insurance might find his recovery limited to the 
actual cost of stolen goods in order to avoid the moral hazard and then 
the self-destructive market that we can associate with payments that 
generate a profit in the event of an alleged theft, so too we must limit 
the insurance or relief for loss of life to modest amounts in an attempt 
to reduce harmful temptations.149 Yet the very reduction in temptation 
effected through such cautious coverage might as a political matter 
doom crime relief from the start. If the families of wealthy or high­
earning crime victims can receive larger amounts of relief, while the 
families of poor victims receive skeleton amounts adjusted to reflect 
anticipated lost earnings, there arises the problem of the government 
investing more resources in crime fighting in affluent areas than in 
poor ones. Governments may already allocate resources and political 
chips in this manner, but the idea of making it more obvious, and even 
encouraging more protection for wealthy persons than for destitute 
ones, is unimaginable at the political level. It will be politically 
unacceptable to find governments balancing their budgets in difficult 
periods by moving police cars from higher-crime poor neighborhoods 
to lower-crime affluent ones, in order to economize on relief costs. 
Any such relief system would reinforce the politically unattractive idea 
that the government should internalize earning power, valuing well­
dressed citizens more than struggling ones. 
Income disparities do appear to be politically acceptable in the 
operation of the 9/11 Fund, both because the recoveries were 
structured to take the place of tort recoveries, which could themselves 
be income based and which would no doubt have been sought at a 
greater rate if the Fund had offered very modest payments to high 
earners' families, and because the moral hazard problem was 
nonexistent inasmuch as 9/11 was an unexpected horror. Murders and 
traffic accidents may be within the control of victims and their families, 
especially so because many are known to go unsolved, but the 
149. There are other numerous analogies from private-insurance markets that would be 
relevant here. For example, many auto collision policies require repairs actually to be made, 
that is, they will issue checks only to the party doing the repair - and in some cases only to 
the repair person picked by the insurer. 
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bombing of lower Manhattan was hardly in the control of the victims. 
It is of course possible to imagine a future tragedy in which a 
calculating and very troubled rescue worker dashed into a building 
with knowledge that, if death strikes, his surviving family will be 
wealthy. But none of this can be the case with respect to 9/11 itself, for 
which there was no close precedent.150 
One method of escaping this set of moral-hazard problems 
associated with crime relief is to make the required payments more 
substantial, but then have the payments go not to the victims' families 
but rather to some third party that is not in a position to exacerbate 
the hazard. Thus, if the government paid half a million dollars 
following each murder (or each unsolved murder, or each murder 
above some modest base rate) and transferred this amount to a group 
of local charities (and perhaps even to a group whose members were 
not identified precisely at the start of each year), it is unlikely that the 
crime relief payments would give anyone an economic incentive to 
commit a crime. A major problem with this plan, however, is that it 
reduces the idea of crime relief to an academic exercise, since it is 
difficult to imagine politicians agreeing to a system in which tax 
revenues must be raised, and in which disbursements are undertaken 
in a manner that advertises the government's own failures with respect 
to crime, but in which the funds then go not to voters or victims but 
rather to parties that are situated outside the political process. Indeed, 
in the preceding sketch, the funds would go to organizations that could 
be seen as competing with the government. But the basic point 
remains to encourage crime prevention and economic development in 
high-crime areas by using economic incentives, and at the same time to 
combat the moral hazard by directing these payouts to parties that are 
not in the position to increase the crime rate. 
A palatable alternative may be to combine the two schemes just 
described. We might seek to encourage crime fighting and 
responsiveness to the citizenry by requiring the larger payments from 
the government, and we might make these payments uniform, 
regardless of the earnings of the victim, in order to make the scheme 
politically and morally acceptable. But then the victims and an outside 
set of charities might have claims on the payments only as required to 
avoid any moral hazard. The payments could go to a "Crime Fund," 
and the Fund's manager could be instructed to pay victims or their 
families only so much as necessary to replace provable lost earnings, 
with a cap of perhaps half a million dollars. The Fund would develop a 
150. It is also noteworthy that the reduction in 9/11 Fund payouts for life insurance and 
pension benefits (payable on death) flattens the payouts from the Fund. It is as if high­
income families are favored by the formula calling for payments to be a function of lost 
earnings but, in return, high-income families do worse, both in relative and absolute terms, 
because insurance recoveries reduce what one receives from the Fund, and high earners are 
extremely likely to have more of this insurance, or collateral source, than are low earners. 
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balance, as many beneficiaries would receive less than that amount, 
and then the Fund's surplus could, on a periodic basis, be distributed 
to specified (or, to fight moral hazard yet more, to unspecified) 
charities.151 
The only reason we have not been insisting on per-life payments of 
the magnitude used in risk management calculations, ranging from 
perhaps $1 million to $5 million, is that moral hazard dangers are 
present, and political pressures will likely prevent payments to wealthy 
families that are dramatically greater than those made to poor ones. 
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that the nonprofit sector (or other 
recipients of the surplus insurance payouts described above) could 
absorb large amounts of funding without producing new inefficiencies. 
Ideally, the surplus payments would go to other crime fighting causes, 
but that method of allocation is a topic left for another day. 
3. Other Objections 
There are, to be sure, other serious objections to a scheme in which 
the government pays when the crime rate is high. There is, for 
example, the danger that a government threatened with liability for 
high crime rates will simply redefine crimes, or so underenforce 
criminal prosecution as to make crime rates look lower simply because 
victims do not bother to report the crimes in question. At least insofar 
as crime fighting is concerned, the sort of scheme described here must 
be put into force by a government (though perhaps one that seeks to 
monitor a subordinate government unit) rather than brought about 
through liability that is imposed by courts. Thus, it is plain that if a 
state means to control a municipality in this way, it cannot allow the 
municipality to define the crimes in question. We imagine a state­
sponsored scheme in which local governments must insure or 
otherwise pay when they exceed rates set and defined by the state. The 
state would need to take steps to make sure that citizens could report 
serious crimes even where the local government preferred to ignore or 
deny the crime. Alternatively, we can imagine innovative politicians 
putting such a scheme into effect in order to bind themselves and 
those who follow them in office. 
There is also a danger that crime payments of the sort sketched 
here would perversely cause an increase in crime. This might occur if 
government payments drew away funds from the very tools that 
governments use to fight or prevent crime. Perverse effects of this kind 
are of course possible, though rare, but we have some faith that a well­
drafted and flexible scheme could avoid such unusual effects. In any 
event, one aim here is merely to introduce the idea of crime insurance 
151. Other plans are discussed in Saul Levmore, Citizen, Warranties and Majorities, 31 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 409 (2004). 
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and to contrast crime insurance (or other payment forms) rather 
favorably with terrorism insurance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the adoption of the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund 
and the new federal terrorism-reinsurance regime, we have 
encouraged the idea of, or at least a comparison to, and a thought 
experiment about, government-sponsored crime insurance. But our 
aim has not been to insist that we must try such a scheme, be it local or 
national in design. Nor has it been to weigh in on the question of 
federal terrorism coverage. Instead, we have simply suggested that the 
case for crime coverage is superior to that for terrorism insurance. 
This is because financial responsibility might well make the 
government a better crime fighter, the underinsurance problem is 
surely greater for crime in impoverished communities than it is for 
terrorism anywhere, and the likelihood that crime insurance will 
generate desirable economic externalities is substantial. 
At the same time, the political emergence of terrorism coverage -
but not crime coverage - is unsurprising. Our analysis began with the 
observation that after-the-fact episodic relief often pours forth after 
catastrophic events, so that disaster insurance can be understood as a 
way of providing certainty and encouraging modest insurance 
requirements at low cost. The idea is that since relief payments will be 
made one way or another, they might as well be marshaled in a way 
that provides some salutary effects in advance of a disaster. In 
contrast, very few crimes elicit sympathetic, public relief of significant 
magnitude, if only because few persons or properties suffer in any one 
event, so that media coverage and political interest are limited. 
However formidable the normative argument in favor of crime 
insurance, it is terrorism coverage that we ought first to expect. 
We would like to see some experimentation with crime insurance. 
The moral hazard problem associated with crime insurance could be 
solved, as suggested, by making partial payments to outside parties 
such as charities. This idea of crime insurance with payments to 
beneficiaries who are in no position to increase crime rates is a novel 
one, but real experience with such a scheme is needed in order to 
judge the success of this solution. We are satisfied that governments 
fight terrorism with full force even when there is no threat of liability, 
but real experience for an extended period of time is needed to assess 
the claim that financial responsibility will make governments take 
superior precautions against more mundane crimes. It is thus possible 
that a useful byproduct of the contemporary inclination to provide 
insurance against terrorism will, in a roundabout way, introduce the 
idea of insuring against crime. 
